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This thesis examines Middle Eastern security issues and problems
which are rooted to geographical considerations or determinants. Geo-
graphy as a security policy determinant is also examined on a national
level in selected countries which are the primary regional actors:
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, and Iraq. A substantial portion
of the work is naturally oriented toward the Arab-Israeli territorial
disputes. It is not, however, restricted to that theme. Demographic
and strategic communications problems, completely separate from the
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Nobody needs to be told that the Middle East, because of its abun-
dant petroleum reserves, is critically important to the economic well-
being of the Western world. Consequently, the intraregional and
national politics, which at first sight might seem insignificant
in their international ramifications, often have profound global
effects. But, by simply reading headlines, one could easily overlook
the fundamental and underlying causes of the region's political
dynamics.
Cardinal among the influences on the region's politics is geography,
At every stage of the region's historical development, geographical
determinants acted as evolutionary catalysts. Strategic waterways,
ports, boundaries, and ethnic groups always were found at the base of
Middle Eastern historical dynamics.
Thus, the thesis presented in this study is that nation-states or
countries have security policy tenets which are dictated by geography.
And, the study of strategic geographic features can contribute greatly
to the understanding and prediction of these policies. Therefore,
this work will analyze the relationships between geography and the
national security policy of selected states in the Middle Eastern
region.

I. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEOGRAPHY
AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TERM GEOGRAPHY
As used in this study, the term "Geography" is not limited to the
original Greek "geographia" meaning to describe the earth's surface,
but is expanded to include man and his interrelationships with his
physical environment. Social, economic, and political systems and
their dependence or adaption to their natural settings are all encom-
2
passed in this broader definition. The usage here, however, will be
more restrictive in that the term "man" will be interpreted to be
mankind in regional groupings or nations. The interrelationships will
be, likewise, restricted to deal only with those that concern the
security of these national groupings and their institutions vis-a-vis
external political focus.
A nation-state refers to a people who are linked by an ideal, be
it religious, linguistic, economic, social custom, political, etc.,
3
who occupy a defined space on our political globe. These nations of
the world are spatially delineated by geopolitical boundaries; boun-
daries which are internationally recognized defining the exact physi-
cal limits of each nation's sovereignty. The nations of the world
(over 150 of them) signing the Charter of the United Nations are equal
4
in their sovereignty. However, the equality ends at the U.N. The
world's nations are decidedly different in territorial size, population,
topography, climate, industrial base, and military capability. These
characteristics are determinants of power and are the ingredients of
policies pursued to ensure economic well-being, security and survival.

Certain ideological, religious, economic or ethnic groups which
do not represent any internationally recognized state (the Palestinians,
Kurds, and others), sometimes referred to as nations, can generate and
project power and must, therefore, be considered in security planning.
B. GEOGRAPHY AND SECURITY
In the pursuit of geo-security goals, it becomes expedient at times
to look beyond the established legal boundary line. Natural boundaries
such as mountains, rivers, water sheds, population groupings, and
oceans often serve as the real dividers of nations. The legal boundary
may and often does lie in the midst of the more tangible natural barrier,
but does not provide the security of the natural buffer.
A problem, of course, arises where one nation seeking absolute
security occupies or uses these natural barriers to the detriment of
the security policy of another. To quote Henry Kissinger: "In a com-
munity of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: The
attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute
injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns
into total insecurity for the remainder..." An ideal example of this
security- insecurity paradox is the Israeli occupation of the Sinai.
Control of this vast desert barrier represents something near absolute
insecurity on the Israeli border to Egypt. Exploring the nature of
such geographically related security policies will be the essence of
this paper.
Generally speaking, one of the most important factors affecting a
Q
nation's security is the location of position of that nation. Every
position on the politically divided globe is unique. This uniqueness

is a product of, among other things, the limited set of relationships
possible with those political entities occupying other positions,
especially those adjacent positions. These peculiar relationships and
a similarly unique historical background couple to form an established
order or a national identity. It is the normal tendency of such an
order to defend or perpetuate itself, which in the case of a nation
often translates into defending its position. And what is important
to the security of this position or order is an assessment of external
threat and the ability of that nation to defend itself against that
threat. Integral to this threat-security assessment is an analysis
of geographic features: Is it near a major trade or communications
route? Does it have suitable harbors? What is the nature of its neigh-
bors and their dividing frontiers? These and many other analytic
9
factors of geography are determinants of security policy. e.g. Nearly
every developed industrial nation of the world except the Soviet Union
is situated favorably on major ocean trade routes. From a security
point of view this is an unfortunate circumstance for Soviet Russia
and, possible, an unfortunate circumstance for those occupying positions
in Russia's path to the sea. These nations blocking Russia's access to
warm water ports must, of course, be conscious of a need for defense
or a security policy mindful of the strategic aims of the Soviet Union.
Physical characteristics are likewise critical aspects of geographic
related national security. Each country, when planning its defense
posture, must pragmatically ask themselves: From where will the enemy
invade? How can the country's critical areas be protected? The loca-
tion of mountains, navigable rivers, deserts, and other prominent
geographic features probably holds the answers or, at the very least, a
10

fundamental part of the answers to these important defensive questions.
Some areas are particularly vulnerable because they represent a soft
invasion route. Others are likely targets because of their economic
value. And yet other territory becomes susceptible to attack because
its occupation would be a strategic asset to the aggressor. The source
of many border disputes presently contested can be traced to attempts
by the contenders to gain positional advantage. Physical geography
then could be a substantial tool in the hands of the security planner.
However, the territory of some nations does not lend itself to defense.
These countries, without national barriers or size enough to swallow
enemy intrusions, could possibly create a system of buffers. The idea
here is simple: Buffer areas are established between domestic land
and the lands of those who might be enemies. The British were parti-
cularly adept at this practice at the height of their colonial empire.
The Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan were all supported by the
British in order to protect her communication routes to India. The
long lived British Raj in India was in part made possible by a carefully
12
constructed system of buffers.
A final global feature which must be evaluated to some extent in
every nation's security planning is the world's oceans. They can act
as defensive barriers as depended upon for centuries by the British
Isles and the Japanese Empires, or they can serve as communication links
upon which the world's great seapowers have projected their offensive
might. Regardless of naval strength, however, the ocean bordering states
have, in essence, a wet buffer which, depending upon their expertise
13
and sophistication, provides a varying degree of security. There
11

have been several scholarly efforts addressed at determining underlying
constants or trends in world foreign/security policy growing out of
geographic position.
C. GEOPOLITICS
During the first half of this century the Englishman Halford
Mackinder revolutionized the study of geography. He proffered a
theory which basically stated that the inner Eurasian land mass was
the pivot region of world politics. Mackinder went on to warn that
world domination could result if one power were allowed to control
the Eurasian heartland. Since he first propounded the theory in 1904,
Mackinder updated it in 1919 to account for technological and population
changes, but the idea was still the same. As stated by Mackinder: "Who
rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland
commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the
world." 14
In 1943, he again updated his theory. He then presented a North
Atlantic unit which was equal in importance to the Heartland. Monsoonal
Asia and the South Atlantic Basin were also listed as significant areas
for the future. An American geographer and foreign policy expert,
Nicholas Spykman, in 1944 followed Mackinder 's school in expounding the
importance of geographical considerations in security policy. He
stressed that the location of a given country relative to the equator,
oceans, land masses, raw materials, and communication routes may well
determine the potential enemies of that country. These locational
considerations, warned Spykman, must be studied and evaluated in con-
junction with the modifying effects of climate and topography. Security
12

problems can and should be viewed in geographic terms, concluded
Spykman, thereby being of direct and immediate use to those who must
formulate foreign policy. Peace or security inevitably involves the
territorial relationships of states and each state must assess its
geographic situation to determine the best security policies.
Today, the Heartland theory has, again, been refined. Saul B. Cohen
in Geography and Politics in a World Divided describes geostrategic
regions. These regions are the trade-dependent Maritime World and the
Eurasian Continental World. The theory does not hold that all political
units comprising the regions have identical strategic or ideological
beliefs. In the case of the Maritime World, however, it does hold that
the economic well being of the region depends upon free trade. Thus,
the strategic security planning of the trade dependent areas must focus
upon communication routes. So, as much as Soviet Russia must strive
to project her power to the oceans, those maritime nations must strive
to ensure their own access to the seas and prohibit the Continental
World from interdicting their lifeline.
The central point here is that the political division and boundaries
of the earth are a dynamic sort of man-made phenomena and the nations
of the world would appear to fall into membership of one of just a
very few major economic or ideological groups. The Soviet Union is,
today, the unofficial leader of the Continental World and the United
States by virtue of economic and military strength is in the vanguard
of the Maritime World. The interest of some nations are so divergent
or backward that most theoreticians would not consider them a part of
either major group. Others, due to technical innovations and/or ideo-
logical ferment, find it necessary or desirable to move from one group
13

to another. Thus, the regional groups are ever changing in membership
and physical size as each vies for positional advantage over the other.
Again, positional advantage represents security or insecurity depending
upon the interests of the viewer. So, the concept of positional advan-
tages would offer an explanation for the seemingly inordinant interest
of the Soviet Union in small, developing countries such as Afghanistan
or Yemen.
Today's national security planners might criticize the dated theories
of Mackinder, Spykman, and even Cohen for being overtaken by technology.
One might ask, with some merit, if modern aircraft and ships do not
negate geographical obstacles. The answer is that, of course, scien-
tific advances have reduced or eliminated what may have been an obstacle
of geography in the past when Mackinder first proffered his theory.
The nuclear submarine, for example, can today effectively operate world-
wide for extended periods without the benefit of overseas bases.
Technology has not, however, permitted aircraft and ships to be used
worldwide without land based support. Without sea and air power it
becomes extremely difficult or impossible to project, or have the capa-
bility to project, power on land in support of security goals.
Modern technical knowledge has permitted the ultimate projection of
force, thermonuclear destruction, without significant influence by
geographical features. But the use of the so-called strategic weapons
must be regarded as the failure to obtain security goals by more con-
ventional means - means which remain profoundly affected by distance
and ease of transport. Stated another way, geography is still a con-
sideration in security planning. Although modern travel has reduced time


























































So, accepting the previously stated ideals of Mackinder, et al
as being viable today, we can fashion a model from these theories to
facilitate viewing world security problems. Understanding the need
of the "Trade-Dependent Maritime World" to have free access to their
trade partners is a key to understanding why the strategic security
planning of these countries must seek to protect trade/ communication
routes. Likewise, the Continental World, led by the Soviet Union,
must in its quest for security seek at least the capability to deny
the trade lifeline to the Maritime World. This basic confrontation of
the Continental World led by the Soviets, and the Maritime World,
dependent upon the open seas, centers in the Middle East. In this
energy-hungry era when the United States, Western Europe and Japan,
among others, are so dependent upon the petroleum from the Persian
Gulf, the Soviet strategists have sought the power to deny, by force
if necessary, that valuable commodity to the West and its allies. In
oil, Soviet Russia found an even more compelling reason than their
Czarist predecessors to expand their influence into the Middle East.
As for the major powers in the Maritime World - e.g. the U.S., Western
Europe and Japan - the Middle East is equally vital for their own
survival, and they are likewise determined to perpetuate the interests
which they have built up through the years.
D. THE MIDDLE EAST
"Middle East" in this paper refers to Egypt and those countries
lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea including
Egypt (see map p. 15 ). The locational importance of this area
cannot be overemphasized. It is a land bridge connecting three
16

continents and sitting astride some of the world's most important sea-
lanes. Major world land and sea trade routes have crossed the region
for millenia and have been the cause of nearly constant geopolitical
19
maneuvers. Six seas and three gulfs project into this tricontinental
area: the Caspian, Black, Aegean, Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian
seas; and the Aden, Oman, and Persian gulfs. The importance of much
of the land area is amplified because it connects these crucial water-
ways. The Suez isthmus is, of course, the most flamboyant example of
20
this increased land value.
In the days before steam powered ships, the trip between Britain
to India took five to eight months when taking the route around the
African continent. The overland routes through the isthmus, which is
the Middle East, proved invaluable. Then, in 1869, upon the completion
of the Suez Canal, the region took on an increased vitality. The
waterborne communication proceeded uninterrupted to the mercantile
21
ports of India and beyond.
As trade from the far flung British, Dutch, and French colonies
poured through the canal and the overland trade routes, along with
it came people, ideas and trappings of varied and exotic cultures.
Southwest Asia, the Middle East, took on a new meaning as the world's
crossroads. Today, roughly a century later, many of the caravan routes
have been replaced by all weather highways and railroads. Oil pipelines
and overhead air routes have also been added to the scene. Shipping is
certainly no less important, although periodically interrupted by
political conflict. As the world's crossroads, it seems a natural
phenomenon that the Middle East has, since the cold war era of the 1950' s,
17

emerged as a barrier between the Eurasian Continental World and the
Maritime World. This fundamentally national struggle has sometimes
been referred to imprecisely or simplistically as the free world versus
the communist world.
This barrier is strategically significant to both if only because
of position. The significance, however, has been multiplied many
fold as the world, especially what we have labeled the Maritime Trade-
Dependent World, becomes more and more dependent on the petroleum
22
originating from the area. Soviet domination of this region could
ruinously deprive the Trade-Dependent World of energy which would
greatly alter the way of life known today. At the same time, such
domination would grant to the navies of the continental powers free
access to the high-seas threatening the very lifeline of the Maritime
World.
The strategic barriers of natural boundaries of the Middle East
are generally comprised of deserts surrounding the critical areas of
Egypt in the Southwest and across the southeastern portion of the
Arabian Peninsula. The high plateaus and mountains of the Northern
Tier act as a divider between Arab and non-Arab populations of the
area. On the eastern side of the region, Pakistan and India are
naturally separated by the Thar or Indian Desert. The Northeast is
crowned by the Pamir Mountain Knot and the Karakoram Range. The
Black and Caspian Seas together with the high lands of the Northern
Tier states provide a more or less natural border between Iran and
Turkey and Soviet Russia. Except in the East and Northeast, the entire
area is nearly surrounded by water. As mentioned, the Black and Caspian
Seas occupy areas in the North. The Persian Gulf and Red Sea, of
18

course, flank the Arabian Peninsula. And finally, the North of Egypt
and western boundary of the rest of the area is bound by the Medi-
23
terranean.
Among the more important of the critical areas are the population
centers along the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq, and
the Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian Peninsula. The bulk of the
region's population is found in the more hospitable climate of the
Northern Tier. Because of the great oil industry, the entire Persian
Gulf and surrounding land area could also be considered a critical
24
area.
Throughout recorded history the area of the Middle East has wit-
nessed the rise and fall of many great empires including Egypt, the
Empire of Alexander, the Seleucid Kingdom, and the competing empires
of the Persians and the Romans. Nearly the entire area was finally
unified by the forces of Islam in the seventh century, and Islam has
been the dominant religion of the region since.
The consistency to be noticed here from ancient history until
nearly the present is that these various empires expanded along communi-
cations or trade routes. The valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates
leading to the silk route to China and the spice routes of India were
as important to the empires of ancient and medieval times as they were
to the British in the last three centuries. The communication links
formed to avoid geographic obstacles have been, for the large part,
constant through centuries. The Nile Valley, the valleys of the
Tigris and Euphrates, the Red and Black Seas, and the Persian Gulf are
today, as they were centuries ago, of great strategic importance. They
are routes which connect continents and oceans, and they provide access
19

to the critical areas of the Middle East. Thus, they provide a way
to control the politics of the region. In short, the region was and
is a fulcrum between cultures - a crossroads, if you will, of civili-
zations.
A review of the modern history of the Middle East may help in
establishing background and continuity for the central theme. By the
18th century, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia,
and Germany all had interests in the Middle East. France began its
commercial and cultural ties in Syria and Lebanon as early as the
Crusades and signed the first treaty of capitulation in 1535 with the
Ottomans. The French gained Algeria as a colony in 1830 and established
Tunisia and Morocco as protectorates in 1881 and 1904, respectively.
After the first world war, she administered Syria and Lebanon through
mandates which was only one result of the long standing economic and
cultural ties. The pervasive influence of the French is very much in
26
evidence in Syria and Lebanon today.
The British influence in the area became considerable after the
defeat of the Napoleonic forces in Egypt at the hands of the English-
backed Ottomans in 1799. From that time the British made inroads into
the territory of the Ottomans and the more remote areas of the Arabian
peninsula. The goal of the British Empire was to protect the communi-
cation routes to India, the Empire's most valued colony. After the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the canal quickly became one of the
world's most important waterways, and the British would exert consider-
able influence to participate in its operations and profits. As a
natural outgrowth of the purchase of shares in 1875 of the Canal
20

Company, the British came to be the protector of all Egypt. The policy
goal of the British was not territorial acquisition, rather it was to
insure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a means of protecting
their own trade routes to India and the East from the expanding
Russians. The British influence was at its zenith just after World
War I when she exercised mandate authority over Palestine and Iraq and
remained protector of Egypt. Also, she assumed positions on the Persian
27
Gulf and Arabian peninsula.
The involvement of Russia in Middle Eastern affairs has been long
standing. The principal goal of the Czarist policy was the attainment
and security of naval and commercial use of first the Black Sea and then
the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean. Southern Russia began rapid
economic development in about 1830. To sustain the growth and inter-
national trade activity of this area, the Moscow government had to '
insure, so-to-speak, a window to the world. As the port of Odessa
grew with increased trade, security of the Straits became tantamount
to the economic well-being of the country itself. By 1880, 50 percent
of Russia's international export trade activity originated on the Black
Sea and transitted the Straits. With this increased dependence on the
narrow waterways, came increased vulnerability and the second of
Russia's principal policy goals: The denial of the straits to the naval
forces of nonriparian states. Great Britain, France and later Germany
represented the gravest threats to Russia's well-being. In other words,
these European countries possessed the necessary power to interrupt her
t. ,_• u 28access to the hxgh seas.
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World War I had a profound effect upon this power balance. Germany
and its ally, Austria-Hungary, were defeated and essentially removed
from the geopolitics in the Middle East. But, the area did not go
wanting for power struggles. After the Ottoman Empire was dismem-
bered, Arab, Kurdish, Turk, Armenian, and other nationalistic move-
ments emerged. Also, new and disrupting to the region was Zionism,
or the growth of the Jewish nation in Palestine. The Middle East
began to take on the political borders we see today.
In 1927, Saudi Arabia established itself and immediately set up a
symbionic relationship with Great Britain.. The British, being the
dominant power in the region, recognized the Saudi state and in return
was granted a privileged position in that country. In the same year,
the British recognized the independence of Iraq and was allowed to have
three air bases in the new country. By 1936, Egypt was relatively free
of Britain's domination, although a military force was left behind to
29
protect the canal zone.
Syria and Lebanon were, during the same period, moving out from
under French control. Lebanon was declared a republic in 1926 while
Syria waited until 1936 before a treaty was ratified which ended the
French mandate. However, France permitted little sovereign activity
in either country. It was not until after World War II that Syria
30
and Lebanon achieved de facto independence.
World War II, in fact, nearly completed the delineation of political
boundaries of the region. In 1946, Jordan became independent and was




World War II truely signalled the end of imperialistic domination
in the Middle East. The death-throes of this domination was probably
seen in 1956 as France and Britain tried unsuccessfully to impose their
will in the Suez Canal area. Although Great Britain mantained military
outposts in the Middle East, she in truth could ill-afford the expendi-
ture required to control the politics of the Middle East. In view of
the rising nationalism, especially among the Arabs, it is doubtful that
31
even the superpowers could exert enough force to control the area.
What we see today is the Middle East emerging with a new found
economic wealth coupled with an old and powerful religious ideology.
It is still the bridge between the Eurasian Continental World and the
Trade Dependent Maritime World to be sure, but its own potential power
gives it an identity separate from the two major geostrategic regions.
So, what is being witnessed today, is the nations of the Middle East
taking control of their own positions. They are refusing to act solely
as a chess board for imperialists. The convenient positions which have
made the Middle East a prized piece of real estate for centuries com-
32
pounds their contemporary national security problems.
The year 1955 seems to be a good beginning point for massive Soviet
involvement into Middle Eastern politics. In that year, amid cold war
tensions, the Northern Tier countries of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and
even Iraq chose to politically align themselves against the Russians
("Russians" is used here vice "Soviet" because the perceived threat
seemed to be traditional Russian Territorial expansion rather than
ideological communist expansion) . This alignment was officially stated
in the Baghdad Pact. Because Soviet policy seemed to be checked by the
Pact, she developed a policy which bypassed the Northern Tier. The
23

Soviets sought to win the cooperation and friendliness of the Arab
World. She extended economic aid and loans to Egypt, Syria and Yemen.
Iraq also gained such favors in 1958 when her pro-Western government was
removed by revolution. The huge arms deal with Egypt in 1955 was the
most visible example of the Soviet strategy to win the Middle East.
Every rift and ideological difference between the Arab and Western
countries was inflamed or exploited by Soviet propaganda. Resentment
traced to years under Western colonial domination only helped the Russian
33
cause.
After the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Soviet Union intensified
her efforts to gain influence among the Arab nations. She centered upon
the nearly complete support of Israel by the United States in her pro-
paganda campaign. Israel was presented as evidence of the still lingering
imperialistic influence in the Middle East. Russia wanted the Arabs
to believe that only she among the superpowers had their well-being
in mind. This campaign certainly paid dividends, not so much because
the Arabs believed in the good will of the Soviets, but because of the
34perceived evils of American supported Zionism/ imperialism.
The long range Soviet objectives were to make the Arab Middle East
economically, technologically, and militarily dependent. She built or
aided in building, among other projects, the Aswan Dam and Helwan Steel
Plant in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria. Also, she and her East
European satellites aided in oil exploration, development and refining
in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Additionally, these countries were equipped
with Russian or communist bloc arms. The Soviet Union wanted, in
summation, to make the power bases of the Arab regimes dependent upon
24

her own system. This marriage of economics, if you will, would insure
a continued Soviet presence in the Middle East and be the means to the
even more important goal of denying this most strategic area to the
35
Western powers.
Thus, at every stage of the operation of historical forces in the
Middle East geography lay at the base. Strategic waterways, ports,
caravan routes, demography and strategic positioning have all been at
the root of the region's politics and security considerations. And,
as these factors impacted in history, so are they fundamental in con-
temporary events. The industrial world's great thirst for Middle
Eastern oil has only served to amplify the significance of the above
listed geographic factors. The research will now look at these geo-
graphic determinants of security policies in three groups of Middle




II. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT
A. SAUDI ARABIA
1. Historical and Geographical Setting
Saudi Arabia has become the leadoff nation in the study because
of its great oil wealth and resulting political power. Additionally,
occupying approximately 4/5 of the Arabian Peninsula, an area roughly
equivalent to 1/3 of the United States, she is, in land area, the
largest of the Arab states.
Compared to the so-called front-line Arab states (those adjacent
to Israel) , the Saudis have remained aloof of what they consider bother-
some, petty politics. From their own point of view, they are, after
all, a nation of the purist, most noble Arab tribesmen who must protect
the faith. Socially medieval by Western standards, Saudi Arabia has,
nevertheless, been politically very stable and a consistent friend of
the United States. She has enjoyed a long standing, excellent working
relationship with a group of American oil companies as a member of the
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) . As defenders of Islam, they
have always been very much anti-communist and unresponsive to communist
propaganda or Russian intervention. The Saudis and Russia have conse-
quently been without diplomatic recognition by one another for nearly
forty years.
For the largest part of its existence, Saudi Arabia has had
little reason to feel insecure. A look at the size and relief features
of this harsh and uncompromising environment indicates how extremely






(see map p. 27 ) . The Western or Red Sea coast has a 15 to 75 mile
wide desolate plain. Springing out of the plain are mountains varying
in height from 3 to 4 thousand feet in the north to 10 thousand feet
on the Yemen border. The northern section of the mountains and plain
is called the Hijaz where the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah are
located. To the south is found Asir, the only area of the entire
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country to receive regular rainfall.
East of the mountains the terrain gently slopes to the Persian
Gulf. The central desert area is called Majd which is the historical
39home of the ruling family and location of the capital, Riyadh.
A vast uninhabitable area known as the Rub'al Khali (The Abode
of Emptiness) bounds the south of Saudi Arabia. The entire area of
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approximately 830,000 square miles is home to only 5-7 million people.
So, until the extent of the petroleum reserves was realized there simply
were no rewards to justify any sort of military conquest - hence a
degree of security.
However, Saudi Arabia now has something worth protecting -
approximately 25 percent of the world's exploitable oil reserves. The
probability of being invaded still seems very slight. The economy,
dependent almost solely on the oil industry, however, renders the king-
dom vulnerable to disruption if not destruction. Oil accounts for over
95 percent of the country's exports by value. Moreover, royalties from
the oil companies contribute in excess of 90 percent of the government
income. Part of this oil export is transported through the Mediter-
ranean port of Sidon via the TAPLINE passing through Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon. The great bulk of this precious commodity, however, is
28

moved by tanker from the terminal at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf.
Herein is found the soft belly of the Saudi economic life and that of
nearly the entire oil producing Middle East. Blockage of the Persian
Gulf could cripple the oil industry of the area and the energy intensive
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economies of the Maritime World.
2. Geosecurity Issue Areas
As has been mentioned above, it would be irresponsible on the
part of the Soviet Union, as the contender of the Maritime World economy,
not to at least develop the capability to take advantage of this acci-
dent of geography - the capability to deny access to the Persian Gulf.
And, it can easily be documented that the Soviet government is actively
constructing a regional, military presence with that very interdictory
muscle.
The Soviet Navy actually entered the Indian Ocean in 1968, and
has gradually increased its strength to the present force of about 20
ships. This task force, however, was balanced by French, British,
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Australian, and U.S. naval presence. But, oil has grown more impor-
tant and the Russian influence more prevalent. In fact, the Russians
seem intent on making the Horn of Africa their own armed camp. In
March of 1978, there were 16,000 Cuban armed forces and 1000 Russian
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advisors in Ethiopia. Also, there is reason to believe that the
Soviets plan to build an air base at Massawa, Eritrea. This base,
coupled with their airfield and base facilities at Aden in Southern
Yemen, control the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It is the concen-
sus of NATO analysts that by building such a presence, the Soviet Union
can threaten the oil routes from the Persian Gulf as well as Saudi
45
Arabia itself. This conclusion is, in fact, the only logical one
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which can be drawn. The only strategic importance of the Horn is geo-
graphy. It controls the approaches to the Red Sea and thus, the Suez
Canal. Therefore, the flow of raw materials to Western Europe and the
Red Sea states could easily be interdicted. Also, it places Russian
military forces within easy reach of the oil producing giants and the
46jugular of the Free World.
There is also evidence of Soviet influence, though not control,
in Oman. This country, lying to the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula
and controlling the Western approach to the Persian Gulf, has been beset
by Marxist guerilla activity. The rebellious Dhofari tribesmen and the
PFLO (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman) have enjoyed the
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support and sanctuary of South Yemen, a Russian client.
Additionally, the Saudis have reason to be leery of their
northern neighbor, Iraq. Although the threat from Iraq seems to have
subsided considerably, she is known to be a political radical with
48
extensive stockpiles of Soviet built weapons. Another Soviet Union
political and geographically strategic move which proved to be uncom-
fortably close to the Saudi 1 s interests, was the imposition of Mohammad
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Taraki's communist regime in Afghanistan.
If we consider the Soviet influence in Libya and the Soviet
naval power in the Mediterranean, it becomes easy to visualize communist
Russia's strategy of encirclement to control the land bridge that is
the Middle East. More importantly, a quest for military dominance cap-
able of closing the Red Sea and Persian Gulf is obvious. Security to
Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other potential external
enemy can be simply stated as protection of the oil fields and freedom
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of access to the high seas. The fact that Saudi Arabia has oil and
requires unrestricted passage through strategic sealanes to market that
oil and receive consumer goods is a factor of geography or a measurement
of power. These factors are critical to the Saudi way of life and must
be central in their national security policy considerations.
Obviously, a country possessing the monetary wealth of Saudi
Arabia would not sit idle while they perceived the threats accounted
above. The Saudis have taken actions to counter the Soviet expansion
in the region which include: (1) Granting aid to Syria to help check
radial Iraq. (2) Using money to persuade Yemen to stop supporting the
Dhofar rebels in Oman. (3) Sold oil to Taiwan at reduced prices because
of their strong ant i-communist politics. (4) Backing secessionists in
Eritrea as a direct counter to the Soviets establishing bases in that
province. (5) Supplying money and arms to Somalia to aid in the fight
against Soviet/Cuban backed Ethiopia.
At home, the Saudis have stepped up their own arms modernization
program including the highly publicized F-15 purchase. Additionally,
there was an unofficial, unspoken alliance among Saudi Arabia, Iran,
the Gulf states and the United States. Where the freedom of the Gulf
and oil transportation are concerned, the interests of these above
listed states are parallel and they conveniently jell to balance the
c • «. 52Soviet presence.
Unfortunately, not all American and Saudi Middle Eastern poli-
cies parallel so nicely. The United States, on one hand, is committed
to the support of Israel, and the Saudis, on the other, consider Zionism
one of the greatest threats to the stability of the region. This per-
ceived threat of Zionism was seemingly repressed or ignored by the
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Saudis while they concentrated on the then more dangerous hazard of
Soviet expansion. However, two seemingly unrelated events - the
Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the fall of the Shah apparently caused a
major shift in Saudi Arabian foreign policy and related security
posture.
When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, the rest of the
Arab world, particularly the more radical front line states, felt that
Egypt had bought their peace, at the insistence of the United States,
with the land of the Palestinians (see p. 49 ) . Most of the Arab
nations were, therefore, lining up politically behind the Palestinians.
The Saudis, whether it be because of religious or pan-Arabic feelings
or a combination, have fallen in line with the other Arab states in
53protesting the peace treaty.
Across the Persian Gulf, in the closing months of 1978, the
37-year reign of the Shah of Iran was falling apart. It was not col-
lapsing because of direct Soviet involvement or because the country
was economically backward. Additionally, the Shaw was, after all, a
long time ally of the United States. One cause the Saudis saw in this
political disintegration of Iran was American backed modernization at
a too rapid pace. Furthermore, the Americans were unable to control
.
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events in the area to their own security advantage.
Two Saudi Arabian political spokesmen, Sheikh Abdul Rakman Al
Ghadhi and Prince Saud, have broken from the American position that
the Soviet Union is the major destabilizing force in the region. Now
the official Saudi position is that Zionism is the worst threat to
Middle East security. Additionally, there have been repeated hints
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that Saudi Arabia will, after a break lasting some 40 years, resume
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (the Saudis at this time
recognize no communist states)
.
The Russians do not appear altogether opposed to the idea of
increased dialogue with the Saudis. After years of standard propaganda
statements referring to the Saudis as "reactionary" and "feudal", the
leading Middle East expert in the Soviet Union, Igor Belyaev, has
recently stated that the Soviet's and Saudi 's views of the needs and
goals of the Arab peoples are congruent and constitute a sound basis
for cooperation. Another example of a softening of attitudes between
the two countries, is the fact that in April, 1979, the Soviet Union's
nation airline has resumed flights into Sanaa, the capital of North
Yemen. This resumption is significant because it had to be done with
the Saudi' s permission.
Trying to interpret these new Saudi policy moves is, of course,
difficult. But it is evident that they feel that their staunch align-
ment with American policy is too costly. Standing too close to the
United States would mean losing friends and leadership in the region.
If the Iranian model has been read correctly, the security partnership
with the Americans carries no guarantee of internal security. The
Saudis have, obviously, decided to stand by their Arab and Muslim bro-
thers. Egypt is, of course, left out of the fold but the Saudis must
feel that they have taken the most stabilizing position. Further,
they have not completely abandoned the American position. Many interests
of the two countries are coincidental. Only in the Palestinian-
Zionism question are they divergent. Closer association with the Soviet
Union has already stopped much of the disturbing Soviet propaganda.
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And there are indications that the Saudis may "play the China card" to
check the bothersome Soviet-Cuban intervention in the region.
Russia also stands to win if diplomatic relations are estab-
lished with Saudi Arabia. The Soviets have an Islamic population of
about 45 million of which they are, in light of the recent revolution
in Iran, somewhat afraid. It would be a legitimatizing factor for the
Soviets in the eyes of their own Muslims to have the recognition of
Saudx Arabia.
Behind these policy considerations, lay the determining factors
of geography. And the trade lines through the Persian Gulf and Red
Sea are the basic determinants in the diplomacy not only of the Saudis
but everyone of the external powers who depend upon Saudi oil. Saudi
Arabia's security policy is consequently oriented toward the protection
of these areas.
If relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia are
warming somewhat, even to the point of diplomatic recognition, it
should not be interpreted as a great strategic victory of geopolitics
for the Soviets. They will not have increased their ability to project
power in the area nor will the Free World's ability have been diminished.
To the Saudis, the communist government of Russia remains "godless" and
fundamentally opposed to the principles of Islam. The Soviets, after
all, have opposed Arab League member, Somalia, in its armed conflict
with Ethiopia and it forced the communist regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki
on the unwilling Muslims of Afghanistan. The Saudis may make accommo-
dations with Russia, China, the United States or others if it is in
their national interest to do so. However, a close alliance with the
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1. Historical and Geographical Setting
Egypt has been linked in the research with Saudi Arabia because
of similar power in world politics. Egypt's influence, however, was and
is not a result of mineral wealth but primarily of strategic positioning,
strategic waterways and demography.
Located on the northeastern tip of the African continent,
Egypt was described in the fifth century B.C. as "the gift of the Nile."
The river, in fact, gave rise to agriculture as early as 5100 B.C. (this
was some 2000 years before such deliberate use of crops and livestock
appeared anywhere else in the world) . The Egyptian Nile Valley was
politically unified about 3100 B.C. and, unlike other early civili-
zations which sprang up and died out throughout the course of history,
the community along the Nile has continued uninterrupted. It is impos-
sible to overemphasize the importance of the life-giving Nile. Without
this geographical accident, Egypt could not exist. The country is
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desert wasteland which is divided by the oasis-like river valley.
The virtually rainless, uninhabitable desert comprises nearly 96
percent of Egypt's 386,000 square mile area (the area is roughly
equivalent to one-half again the size of Texas). After subtracting the
land area covered by urban development and inland water, there is left
only about 3.5 percent of the total area to support a population of
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over 40 million people. This entire population, save about 4 percent,
is found in the narrow Nile Valley and protruding delta (nearly two-
6"3
thirds of the people are located in the delta).
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Egypt enjoys, compared to her Middle Eastern neighbors, a very
homogenous population. Over 90 percent are of Eastern Hamite stock
with minorities composed principally of Greeks, Italians, and Syro-
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Lebanese. The significance of these seemingly endless statistics
about the rivers, land, and population is that they point out the nearly
absolute dependence of the country upon the Nile. The entire valley
running south to north through the length of the country is the essence
of what the geographers term, a critical area.
The Nile and its associated agriculture and communications net-
work permitted or caused the homogenuity of the population and the
early development of the entire valley as a single, political unit as
opposed, for instance, to the city states of Mesopotamia. Additionally,
the surrounding terrain would support or hide secessionist activity.
Therefore, once central authority was established, its continuance was
1*4 1 65relatively easy.
The agriculture activity of the ancient Nile community did,
however, have at least one drawback: It attracted foreign conquerors.
Egypt, until 1952, had, in fact, been under 2500 years of foreign
domination including Persians, Greeks, Romans, Circassians, Arabs,
Turks, and finally the British. Each of these conquerors certainly
left some of their own culture to blend with that of Egypt. The Arabs,
however, profoundly altered the social institutions of the country.
Arab soldiers first raided the Nile Delta in 639 A.D. By 641, they
had seized control from the occupying Byzantine forces and established
a permanent camp at Al Fustat, present day Cairo. In a relatively brief
two and three centuries, the Arab-Islamic culture had all but supplanted
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the traditional-Coptic social structure. This Arab-Islamic social and
religious order continued through the domination of the Turks and the
British. Today, the country is officially an Arab nation with Islam
being the national religion.
This brief, highlighted, geosocial/geopolitical background,
exerts its influence on the modern security problems and policies
arising out of Egypt's geographical features. Unlike previous con-
querors who were attracted by agricultural abundance or were using
Egypt as a bridge to reach further destinations, the British valued
Egypt only for its strategic geographic position. This time period,
characterized by the above mentioned contrast in goals, and a globally
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awakening world is a logical place to begin.
In the closing years of the eighteenth century, Egypt was
under the loose suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans,
however, did not have the strength nor the inclination to deny access
to the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte of France in 1798. France, for
her part, was not primarily after Ottoman territory. Rather, her in-
vasion of Egypt was a strategic ploy aimed at the British Empire.
She hoped to restrict the easy movement and commercial links from
Great Britain to Asia and, in turn, enhance her own position with
respect to Asia. In the same year they arrived, the French fleet was
destroyed by British seapower, and finally in 1801 the remainder of the
French forces were routed out of Egypt by combined British and Turkish
forces. The importance here should not be placed on the expulsion of
the French, but on the fact that Egypt, because of her geographic
position, was thrust into the geopolitics of Europe.
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To Britain, the Middle East was simply a bridge to her Asian
Empire, albeit an extremely weak bridge which required constant British
maintenance. The Ottoman Empire controlling Russia's access to the sea
at the Turkish Straits and checking the Czar's historical desire to
expand southward, was constantly supported by Great Britain. By infu-
sing strength into the Ottomans, the British were able to protect the
routes to Asia through the Middle East. The acquisition of Cyprus by
the British and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, however, changed
the security policy of Great Britain and their primary communication
routes to the East. It was no longer so important to prop up the
Ottomans. The concentration of the British shifted to Egypt and Suez.
Keeping the canal open, in fact, became an overriding principle of the
trade-dependent Empire. When, in 1882, antiforeign riots led by Arabi
Pasha threaten the safety of British interests, specifically the canal,
Britain occupied the Nile Delta ostensibly to restore peace. But the
British soon extended their military domination throughout the Nile
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Valley and into the Sudan.
Believing that her very economic life depended upon it, Britain
clung to Egypt, the Suez Canal and her influential position throughout
the Middle East even after her Asian Empire had all but disappeared.
The Zenith of British influence in Egypt was during World War
I. With her Empire still intact but severely threatened, Britain,
ignoring Ottoman sovereignty, claimed to be the protector of Egypt.
Almost Immediately after the war, however, British control was to be
seriously questioned. Nationalistic urgings were maturing within Egypt
j -,. 70in opposition to British rule and military presence.
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In an effort to placate these nationalist movements, the British,
in 1922, declared Egypt, with certain selfserving reservations, to be
independent. Great Britain, to insure her geographic advantage in
Egypt, insisted upon, among other things, the secure communications
of the British Empire in Egypt and the right to protect Egypt against
foreign aggression. Without complete sovereignty, the various nationa-
lists would not be stilled. The Egyptian position was softened, however,
when the Italians imposed their rule on Ethiopia. The need for British
military presence to deter the ambitious Mussolini, for the time being,
outweighed their political aspirations. Thus, on August 26, 1936, the
Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed recognizing Britain's vital interest
in the Suez Canal and her right to protect this most crucial of the
.., „ 71world s waterways.
The strengthening forces of nationalism following World War II
proved to be far too powerful for the weakened British to control
effectively. Great Britain tried desparately to facilitate an agree-
ment which would satisfy the nationalistic ambitions of the Egyptians
while allowing the British to protect her commercial and military inte-
rests in the Canal Zone. This time, the security of the Canal was
not the stumbling block to an agreement. The impasse was caused by
Egyptian claims in the Sudan. The central consideration here was the
Nile, Egypt's vital waterway. The Egyptians were afraid that if they
had no say in the political processes in the Sudan, that it was con-
ceivable that the life-giving Nile waters could be denied to Egypt.
This geographical problem, from the Egyptian point of view, was one of
strategic national interest. As a consequence, the Anglo-Egyptian-
Sudanese difficulties continued until February 12, 1953, when it was
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agreed that the Sudan would enjoy self-determination after a three year
transitional period. On October 19 of the same year, the final agree-
ment on the disposition of the Canal was signed. Under this agreement,
British troops were to completely evacuate Egypt, but Britain retained




Although it seemed that Egypt was to take charge of her own
security policy for the first time in many years, she could not escape
the fact that her position kept her in the midst of world geopolitics.
As Egypt was wrestling free of British suzerainty, the so-called cold
war between the world's "free" countries, championed by the United
States and the Russian-led communist world, was dominating the security
planning of all of the world's powers. And, as could be expected of the
strategically situated Egypt, she was soon the fulcrum of the cold war.
Egypt, traditionally identified with Western political ideology,
was moving under the leadership of Gamal Abd Al Nasser to neutralism.
The Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact, for instance, was opposed by Nasser
because of the likelihood of the Pact drawing the Arab world into an
"imperialistic" war. This political shift toward neutrality on the
part of Egypt was distressing to the United States but consistent with
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Soviet policy goals.
2. Modern Geosecurity Issues
Superimposed on the cold war politics of the Middle East and
Egypt was the Arab-Israeli conflict. On February 28, 1955, the Egyptians
suffered an embarrassing defeat in the Gaza Strip, as their headquarters
were raided by the Israelis. In the long term, this raid is only impor-
tant because it precipitated arms shopping by Nasser. He naturally
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turned to the West, Washington specifically, for his desired purchase.
When Egypt was refused weapons by the United States, she concluded the
now famous Czeck arms deal. The West immediately had visions of the
communication routes and energy reserves of the Middle East being
controlled by the communists. The Russians, on the other hand, hoped
that they had outflanked the Baghdad Pact. One result of this situation
was that the Egyptian-Israeli regional conflict was taking the appear-
ance of surrogate world war.
While the actual battles seeking territorial conquest and
control were of genuine concern in terms of superpower geopolitics, they
represented crucial geostrategy to the regional contenders, in this case,
Egypt and Israel. There have been four major confrontations between
these two Middle Eastern nations and they all resulted from geographic
determinants. The proximity of the Egyptian border to Israel's critical
areas places Israel in an extremely insecure position militarily (i.e.
Tel Aviv is 130 kilometers from the Egyptian border). In the 1956 and
1967 wars, the Israeli strategy, vis-a-vis Egypt, was to carve a buffer
out of Egyptian territory. In both cases, Israel occupied the Sinai
peninsula. The net effect here was to place Cairo only 130 kilometers
from the military forces of Israel. Hence, Egypt was placed in an
insecure position, vis-a-vis Israel. The effect of such a positional
disadvantage on an economically developing country such as Egypt could
be catastrophic. Her security objectives were forcibly changed to
compensate for the loss of the Sinai. Egypt had to devote more resources
to her armed forces. She had to increase the strength and efficiency
of these forces while acquiring modern sophisticated weapons without
unacceptable political compromises. And, most importantly, Egypt had
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recover the Sinai. It could even be argued, rather well in fact,
that this economic hardship and military insecurity led to the Egyptian
armed forces crossing the Canal in October of 1973. President Sadat
had good reason to believe that the superpowers would not let either
side gain too great of a military advantage. But he also probably
7fi
believed that he could only improve his security position.
Another move by Sadat, possibly caused in part by his country's
insecurity, vis-a-vis Israel, was to bring his policies more closely
parallel to the influential political and economic powers of the area
(e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran). The assumption here was that the United
States would not pressure Israel into an equitable settlement because
the Arabs had brought the Russians into the Middle East. So it was
concluded that if Egypt followed the lead of the anti-communist
Saudis and Iranians, the Americans would no longer be dependent on the
Israelis as a balance in the Middle East and would, therefore, be
free to shape a Pax Americana. The net result of this Egyptian policy
shift was the abrogation, on May 5, 1976, of their treaty with the
o • 77Soviets.
The most recent product of Egypt's foreign/security policy
was the peace treaty with Israel. Unfortunately for Egypt, the unof-
ficial alliance with which she had cast her security policy was falling
apart. With the demise of the Shah's regime in Iran, it seems evident
that Iran (and possibly Saudi Arabia) have been moving away from their
close association with the United States. Egypt has, consequently,
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been left without any regional support.
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In summary, it seems clear that the history of Egypt is the
child of geography. Egypt became a nation largely because of the Nile.
She could contribute her early success as a unified nation to her unique
geographical environment. In the modern world, the strategic geo-
graphical position of Egypt controlling access to the Middle East's
communication routes caused her many years of foreign domination.
Even after winning her freedom, she could not escape superpower in-
fluences. Executing a security policy seeking territorial integrity,
political independence and national defense proved to be extremely
difficult. The superpowers sought influence in Egypt because of. her
strategic geographical position. Israel's territorial conquests
into Egypt were designed to grant geographical security. And, in
contemporary times, Egypt is seeking security for her two critical areas,
the Nile Valley and Delta and the Suez Canal. To that end, her attempts
to pacify her border with Israel have been central. She cannot ignore
the possibility of threats coming from other quarters but she can
depend on her vast deserted lands to afford a degree of protection.
As for Russia and the United States involved in the Continental
World-Maritime World struggle, their interest in Egypt has always been
one of geography. When any of the Soviet leaders speak of the Middle
East, they usually mention their "legitimate interests" based on geo-
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graphic proximity. The recent importance of Middle Eastern oil has
only served to heighten the interest of Russia, the United States and













A. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING
If, as has been stated, the Middle East is the world's crossroads,
Israel would seem to be the point of convergence. To be sure, she
connects, along with Egypt, the Asian continent with Africa and borders
both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (see map p. 44 ). But in
a less tangible sense, though equally real, Israel has become the
focal point of the region's geo-politics. When modern Israel was
established in Palestine, at a time when indigenous nationalism was
growing into maturity, she was the embodiment of western imperialism
and, therefore, insecurity to her surrounding Arab neighbors. The
net result of Palestine's geographic location to the Zionist movement
was that Israel was born into a hostile environment. Her geographic
position left the defense strategists with a seemingly impossible
problem.
Historical events of the Jewish peoples and Palestine must be
recounted in order to understand the geographical security position
of modern Israel.
From the beginning the close relationship of geography and history
is inseparable. Establishing the Zionist movement and connecting it
with Palestine is rooted to the very beginning of Jewish history.
Biblical texts tell of Abraham, the oldest of the Jewish patriarchs,
leading his people into Canaan, later known as both Israel and
Palestine. These Semitic migrations are thought to have occurred about
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2000 B.C. and in Jewish theology gave rise to the "Chosen People"
belief. In Genesis 12, it is related that Abraham received a divine
covenant granting the land to the Jews: "...Unto thy seed will I
give this land..."
There was a later migration of the Jewish peoples into Egypt (pro-
bably in the 18th century B.C.) where they remained, according to
Jewish tradition, for 400 years. Probably during the reign of Pharoah
Rameses II (c. 1304-1237 B.C.) they left Egypt under the leadership of
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Moses seeking the land promised to Abraham in Genesis 17 : "...And
I will give to you and to your descendants after you, the land of your
sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession..."
Further historical or biblical identification of the Jewish people
with the land of Israel is ascribed in Numbers 33:
. . .And the Lord said to Moses in the plains of Moab by the
Jordan at Jericho, "Say to the people of Israel, When you pass
over the Jordan into the land of Canaan, then you shall drive
out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, and destroy
all their figured stones, and destroy all their molten images,
and demolish all their high places; and you shall take pos-
session of the land and settle in it, for I have given the land
to you to possess it...
The Jewish nation did become a state and flourished until 722 B.C.
when the northern half fell to the Assyrians. The southern half fell
about a century later to the Babylonians. Both of the conquerors
deported thousands of the Jews as slaves. Those remaining in Palestine
u • , .83lost their identity as a nation.
The Jewish community was maintained by some of those in captivity
in Babylon until Cyrus II of Persia defeated the Babylonians in 539 B.C.
and allowed voluntary return of the Jews to their "Promised Land."
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Palestine passed from Persian control to that of the Greeks and sub-
sequently to the Romans. Under the Roman emperor, Hadrian (A.D. 117-
138), the Jews were again repressed. Seeking cultural uniformity,
Hadrian forbade the Jews from following their traditional ways and
later dispersed them throughout the known world. The religion, litera-
ture and culture survived in Dispora but the Jewish way of life was
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all but extinct in Palestine.
In 1882, three Zionist colonies, Rishon le Zion in Judea, Zichron
Jacob in Samaria, and Rosh Pina in Galilee, were established in Pales-
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tine beginning anew the quest for a Jewish homeland. These settle-
ments were the vanguard of what has come to be called the First Aliyah -
the first immigration wave. The catalysts for this demographic movement
were many, but principal among them were increased anti-Semitic trends
in Europe coupled with the financial backing and expertise of Baron
Edmond de Rothchild and the leadership of the internationally reknown
writer, Theodor Herzl. (Herzl's book, Per Judenstaat published in
Vienna in 1896, spread the idea of Zionism throughout Europe).
A second wave of immigration started arriving in Palestine in
1904 driven by the mass pogroms in Kishinev and Gomel in Russia.
By the outbreak of World War I, there were eighty-five thousand Jews
in the "Promised Land." However, the possibility of a Jewish state
in Palestine seemed very remote, indeed. In the first place, the
land being inhabited by the Jewish immigrants was the sovereign
property of the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the indigenous Arab resi-
dents were beginning to feel nationalistic tendencies of their own





World events probably more than personalities allowed the Jewish
state movement to gain political power. The Ottoman Empire was allied
with Germany against, among others, Great Britain in World War I.
At a time when the war was not going well for the British they were
willing to, and in fact did, make contradictory bargains with both
the Jews and Arabs in order to enlist aid in the fight against Germany,
Mindful of the eternal geographic importance of the Middle East to
the Arabs, the British promised postwar support for independence. The
territorial boundaries of state were not explicitly defined bu t the
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Arabs were certain that it included all of Palestine.
Meanwhile, the political leverage gained by explosives expert,
Dr. Chaim Weizmann, through his potential value to the British war
effort won Great Britain's support for the Zionist movement. The
British government officially promised to view with favor the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.
Concerning this home, in what has come to be known as the Balfour
Declaration the British stated in a simple letter from the foreign
secretary, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a
leading British Zionist, the following:
"Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying
to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which
has been submitted to, and approved by, the cabinet: 'His
Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will
use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and poli-
tical status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' I should
be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the know-
ledge of the Zionist Federation.
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Following the war,' Great Britain was made the Mandatory Power for
Palestine. Under the terms of the Mandate the historical connection
between the Jewish people and the land of Palestine was recognized.
The pledges made by the British during the war years to the Arabs and
to the Jews were, however, mutually exclusive. In fact, the Balfour
Declaration, itself, contained contradictory ideas. How could a
"Jewish National Home" be created in Palestine without prejudicing
the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities -
especially considering that these communities comprised nearly 92
percent of the Palestinian population? The central point here is
that the Arabs of Palestine were very apprehensive about the newly
established national home of the Jews. As the immigration into
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Palestine increased the apprehension increased.
The mass immigrations forced by Hitler's Germany only worsened
Britain's mandate problems. The Arabs becoming more and more anxious
because of what they perceived as a seizure of political power by the
Zionists declared a general strike. The Peel Commission, dispatched
in response to the strike, found the differences between the Arabs
and Zionists to be irreconcilable and Great Britain's position between
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the two as untenable.
World War II delayed the inevitable. But after many commissions,
studies and conferences the British government announced in February
1947 that the problem would be turned over to the United Nations.
On the 14th of May 1948 the British lowered the Union Jack in Jeru-
salem and the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel was
92




Geographic determinants existed from the day Israel was born. The
new Jewish state immediately had security problems which threatened its
very survival. Israel, on its first day of official existence, was
invaded by a combined Arab army. (The invading force consisted of
approximately 10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Arab Legionnaires, 7,000 Syrians,
8,000 Iraqis, and 3,000 Lebanese). The Israelis had roughly 30,000
troops to defend their ill defined country. These forces - nine
brigades - were carefully allocated to defend what the Israelis thought
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to be their critical areas. Three of the brigades were designated
to protect the north. Two were held in the central coastal plain to
guard Tel Aviv. Two more were dispatched against the Egyptian threat -
one in Rehovot Isdend and another in the northern Negev. And, finally,
to protect the Holy City, a brigade was designated to protect Jeru-
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salem and another for the highway in the Jerusalem Corridor.
Thus, the defensive deployments were designed to protect two main
geographical areas. First, the coastal plain and its burgeoning new
city, Tel Aviv. With a swelling population of over a quarter-million,
Tel Aviv housed nearly three times the Jewish population of New Jeru-
salem and was perhaps the Middle East's most technologically advanced
city. The survival of this city in the Palestine War or the War of
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Independence was tantamount to the survival of the young state.
Jerusalem was the other key element to be defended. The historical
identification of the Jewish people was inextricably tied to the Holy
City. The term, "Zionism", is said to have originated, after all,
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He wrote of his longing to return to Jerusalem and Mt. Zion (see
si ^ 96map p. jJ- )
.
Another fundamental element in the defense of Israel and the
eventual determinants of Israel's international borders was the
kibbutzim . These agricultural villages had literally been staking
out the Jewish claim to the Palestinian territory for over 60 years
prior to the 1948 war. The area and shape of Israel, until June
1967, was largely a result of the kibbutzim's location. These
colonies, most importantly, performed a semi-military role. They
acted as a defensive picket line preventing or at least signaling
enemy invasion or infiltration. A secondary and passive role of these
settlements was offering a means of dispersing the population. Speci-
fically, the kibbutz gave Israel a place to send new immigrants, thus
preventing concentration in the central plain and demographic inse-
rt 97curity.
The war was extremely taxing on the economics and resources of all
the contenders. Compounding the difficulties of the Arab side, the
individual nations were pursuing different goals. The Syrians, for
instance, were principally attempting to settle territorial claims
against Palestine which were lingering since the 1919-20 Paris Peace
Conference. King Abdullah of Transjordan, on the other hand, was
interested in controlling Jerusalem. By so doing, he could regain
some of the stature lost from his Hashimite family when his father
surrendered Mecca and Medina to the Saudis in 1925. This lack of
central effort and leadership coupled with the economic ramifications



























































































Israel for her part was, as stated above, severely strained by her
War of Independence. But, she was contradistinguished from her Arab
enemies by her singleness of purpose. Israel was fighting for her
99independence and, in fact, her very existence.
In December of 1948, Israeli forces drove the Egyptians into the
narrow Gaza Strip (see maps p. 53-54 ) and started into the Egyptian
Sinai. To preserve their territorial integrity the Egyptians asked
for a cease fire. The subsequent armistice between Israel and Egypt
established a temporary frontier separating the two. Egypt retained the
Gaza Strip but the arbitrary lines kept many Arab villages from their
f 1 A 100farmlands
.
An armistice between Israel and Lebanon recognized the pre-war
frontier and demilitarized each side. The Syrian boundary took a while
to be settled but finally ended as they were drawn in 1920 - the Sea of
Galilee and the upper Jordan remain, for the most part, in Israel.
The exception was the Lake Hulah marsh which became a demilitarized
101
zone.
The frontier with TransJordan was perhaps the most difficult to
settle. The western powers in the United Nation debates agreed that
King Abdullah should annex the remainder of Arab Palestine. Israel,
however, was unwilling to give up the Negev. The demarcation finally
agreed upon, like the one in Gaza, separated Arab farmers from their
land.
Having successfully defended herself, Israel now had the luxury to
reflect on future geographic security policy. She ignored the cease
fire arrangement in Jerusalem and later the armistice with Egypt to
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push south hoping to gain access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Such a position
would permit Israel to bypass the Suez Canal and open a route to the
Orient. For a country so recently struggling for its very survival,
this acquisition of the port (now known as Eilat) was very sophisticated
geographical security policy indeed.
In May 1948, following the Rhodes Armistice agreements, Israel
gained membership in the United Nations thus achieving status as a
sovereign nation. Her international borders were defined by the Rhodes
Armistice demarcation line. However, these boundaries, as mentioned
above, were in places thoughtlessly delineated and were, consequently,
the source of nearly constant conflict. Israel, in fact, shared 600
miles of frontier with avowedly hostile neighboring states. Occupying
only 8000 square miles, she could not rely on territorial depth for
defense. Only in the Negev could an Israeli citizen withdraw more than
20 miles from an Arab border. Contributing to her vulnerability,
Jordan would only have to move 9 to 10 miles toward the Mediterranean
Sea to cut Israel in half. Or, in a coordinated attack, Egypt and
Jordan would only have to move approximately 25 miles to sever the
Negev and the strategically important Eilat from the remainder of the
104
country.
The corridor to Jerusalem narrowed at points to only 10 miles and
the Jewish Quarter of the city was surrounded by hills and could easily
be menaced by Jordanian artillery. Syrian artillery, likewise, threatened
settlements in Galilee from their positions on the Golan Heights. The
security situation of Israel was probably best summed by Moshe Dayan:
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The area of the country is only 8,100 square miles. But
owing to the configuration of its territory there are 400 miles
of frontier. Three-quarters of the population of Israel lives
in the coastal plain... The country's main roads and railways are
exposed to swift and easy incursion. Scarcely anywhere in Israel
can a man live or work beyond the easy range of enemy fire...
Thus the term frontier security has little meaning in the
context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a fron-
tier, and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by .._,
any hostile activity from the territory of neighboring states.
Parenthetically, there is a significant difference between the
600 mile border sighted above and the 400 miles mentioned by Moshe
Dayan. At the time of independence the Israeli boundaries were as
follows: 49 miles with Lebanon in the north; 47 miles with Syria
in the northeast; 332 miles with Jordan and 165 miles shared with
Egypt. The total was then 593 miles.
In demographic terms, the surrounding Arabs populations out-
numbered Israel's by forty to one, and the proportion of uniformed
fighting men was eight to one in favor of the Arabs. And from the
Israeli point of view the Arabs were seeking to manifest their geo-
graphic advantage and population superiority in the complete destruc-
tion of Israel as an independent state. Thus, Israel perceived herself
as being extremely vulnerable and this vulnerability was and is a pre-
• r. -, • r .107occupation in her security policy formation.
It did not take long after the Arab-Israeli General Armistice
Agreements went into effect in 1949 before they began to unravel.
The Arabs emphasized those parts of the agreements which stated that
the demarcation lines were not to be construed in any way as political
or territorial boundaries. Israel countered by stressing that the
Arab economic boycott against her was an illegal act of war. As time
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\passed, Israel began to claim that the demarcation lines were, in
fact, legal borders and the demilitarized zones were part of her
108
sovereign territory.
The hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees created by the
war were also a continuing source of animosity. Egypt and Lebanon,
for instance, already had an overpopulation problem and were unable
to easily absorb those fleeing Israel. Many would attempt to reenter
their homeland only to be shot or expelled as infiltrators by the
Israelis. Some of the refugees did in truth reenter with terrorist
objectives which started a vicious cycle of retaliations. Before too
long these border incidents and retaliatory raids were very much
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official policy being carried out by regular military units.
More and more the Arab leadership was speaking of a "second round"
in which Israel would be pushed into the sea. Meanwhile, Israel's
leaders, especially those of the Hernt Party - were insisting upon
expansion to take Akaba, all of Palestine and even Transjordan. In
sum, both sides felt threatened by the other; they completely dis-
trusted one another and unfortunately were both quite inflexible in
policy toward the other.
The large amounts of Czech or "Soviet bloc" arms going to Egypt
in 1955 started a chain of events which proved impossible to stop
short of war. The apparent move of Egypt toward Russia in the cold
war atmosphere caused the United States to withdraw financial support
from Nasser's Aswan dam project. Nasser, in response, nationalized
the Suez Canal. In order to protect interests in the Suez, Britain
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and France, in turn, started a heavy military buildup on Cyprus. Nasser
countered the British and French by moving 60,000 men and her large
weapons to protect Cairo and Alexandria. The net result was that the
Sinai and Gaza were left practically without armed security.
As the region's military situation was altered by the Suez Canal
nationalization, Israel felt that she was near an impasse with her
military and economic situation vis-a-vis the Arab world. The fedayeen
raids were becoming increasingly numerous and violent; with the large
arms imports into Egypt the military balance was shifting; and her
commerce through the Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba was severed. Addi-
tionally, with Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran closed to her shipping,




The recourse was to initiate a "preventive war." Israel had warned
in July of 1955 that she would use force if Egypt sought to restrict
or hamper the flow of essential goods to Eilat. Thus, Israel's main
objective in launching the war was to ensure free transit through the
Gulf of Aqaba. She also hoped to destroy fedayeen bases and some of
Egypt's newly acquired weapons. Additionally, it was Israel's desire
to take conquered Egyptian territory to the bargaining table to barter
113
for a lasting peace settlement on her own terras.
With British and French support, the Israelis resorted to war.
The campaign was, from the Israeli point of view, well executed and
the military objectives were acquired. Few of the political objectives,
however, became reality. The Suez Canal remained closed to Israel;
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United Nations intervention prevented her from using the conquered
territory as the desired political lever; Egypt's arms stockpiles
were replenished by Russia and captured British materials; and the
border problems continued. However, Israeli shipping through the
Strait of Tiran and Aqaba to Eilat was restored thus assuring the
114geographical advantages of that southern port.
The war of 1956, usually designated as the Sinai war did very
little to change the attitudes and strategic positions between the
Arabs and Israelis. If there was a change, it was probably that
relations became more hostile. Border infiltrations by the Palestinian
refugees steadily grew in frequency and organization. A small militant
group known as al-Fatah composed of young Palestinians familiar with
Israeli territory spearheaded this new wave of terrorist activity.
Although al-Fatah selected targets carefully and usually chose to
interrupt Israeli water projects their primary goal was to keep alive
emotional attachments of the refugees to their homeland.
From the Israeli point of view, the incessant al-Fatah raids served -^
to exemplify their geographic security problems - the lack of depth,
and long, difficult to defend frontiers. Israel, on the other hand,
raised the ire of the Arabs, particularly the Syrians, by trying to
agriculturally develop contested territory. On the 7th of April 1967,
perhaps the most serious of these clashes took place. From Israel's
perception, the Syrians opened fire on an "unarmed" tractor working on
"Israeli lands." The Syrians, of course, saw the circumstances a
little differently. She claimed that the Israelis sent an "armed"
tractor on "disputed" lands and opened fire on Syrian positions. The
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truth is not as important as the results. What started with small
arms fire escalated to an artillery and mortar duel. Finally, before
a cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO) , Israeli jets strafed and bombed Syrian positions
and caused extensive property damage and loss of life. As a conse-
quence, the Arab countries closed ranks and pledged support for
„ . 116Syria.
As the border situation between Syria and Israel became more tense,
Syria indicated that she would invoke her defense treaty with Egypt.
Nasser and his Arab leadership, as an exhibit of solidarity, on May
15, 1967, placed the Egyptian armed forces on alert. With United
Nations Emergency Forces in position in the Sinai, the alert was a
meaningless demonstration. Nasser, therefore, on the following day
asked the U.N. to remove their forces and he began a buildup in the
Sinai with his own troops. Now in a position to again stop Israeli
shipping Egypt was under extreme pressure from her Arab neighbors to
prevent Israel's ships from passing through the Strait of Tiran.
Nasser announced the closure on May 22.
Another strategic development which threatened the security of S
Israel took place on 30 May 1967. King Hussein of Jordan signed a
defense pact with Egypt. Under the agreement the Jordanian forces
were placed under the command of the Egyptian, Major-General Abdul
Munim Riad. Also, Iraqi and other Arab troops were allowed on
Jordanian soil. Israel's defense depended, in part, on quick mobility
from one frontier to another in order to meet the attacking enemy
with the maximum force. Having the Arab armies under a unified
command made a multi-fronted war a greater possibility, thus weakening
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Israel's strategic posture. On the third of June the Israeli cabinet
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voted overwhelmingly in favor of launching a "preventive war."
It would be difficult to cite which one event or combination of
events caused the Israelis to go to war. But, many observers and
analysts believe that the Arab attempt to neutralize the geographical
advantages of the Red Sea port at Eilat galvanized Israel into action.
Premier Eshkol called the blockade an act of aggression. The loss of
free navigation to and from Eilat connecting Israel to her markets in
Japan and the rest of Asia, and to the Persian Gulf oil was so threat-
ening to her security and survival that Israel declared that she would
119fight rather than let Nasser cut her communications routes.
Also, concerning Israel's motivations for waging a preventive
war Edgar O'Ballance in his book, The Third Arab-Israeli War
, stated
the following:
"...My considered opinion is that the closing of the Straits
of Tiran and the attempted strangulation of the southern port of
Eilat made war certain. ...The Israeli Government's reaction
to the closure of the Straits of Tiran was one of shock and
anxiety. Premier Eshkol took the- unusual step of consulting
leaders of opposition parties..."
The restriction placed on the viability of Eilat was cited before
as a principal cause of the 1956 Sinai War. This decision by Israel
to go to war was an example of security policy dictated by geographic
concerns. The June 1967 War was even a more flamboyant example of
such a policy. By attacking and militarily defeating their Arab
antagonists Israel hoped not only to reassert their position in Eilat,




Initially, the policy goals were probably limited to stopping
terrorist raids and border conflicts; to destroying as much military
capability of the confronting Arab armies as possible; to opening
crucial sealanes; and to forcing a peace settlement with her Arab
neighbors. However, the Israeli policy goals became more ambitious
as their military successes grew.
Israel, in the Six Day War, conquered territories nearly six times
her own size and, by so doing, altered significantly her geo-security
situation. By occupying Sinai she completely reversed her strategic
position vis-a-vis Egypt. Egypt and Jordan could no longer easily
unite their forces and sever Israel at the waist. Tel Aviv was now
some 300 miles from Egypt's armed forces. And as Tel Aviv and the
rest of Israel gained in security because of the Sinai buffer Egypt
122became more vulnerable.
A similar reverse in strategic positioning was enjoyed by Israel
on the Golan Heights. By winning control of the heights, Israel removed
many of her citizens from their hostage position under Syrian artillery.
She also gained a commanding position over the coveted head waters of
the Jordan River and moved her military to within 40 miles of the
Syrian capital of Damascus. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
victory on the Golan to Israel's security was that Syria was denied
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an easy invasion route.
Jordan also lost strategic positioning to Israel. With the West
Bank now being occupied by Israel, key Jordanian bases and staging
areas were neutralized. Amman, Jordan's capital, like Cairo and
Damascus, also became more vulnerable to Israeli air power. (Israel's




Israeli officials were quick to let it be known that they would
handle the newly occupied lands according to their own security dic-
tates. The government clearly intended to hold on to the conquered
lands until peace was guaranteed. In short, land was to be bartered^
for security. The Sinai clearly fell into this category. Prime
Minister Rabin concisely stated Israel's geographic security considera-
tion in the Sinai as follows:
"I am in favor of making far reaching concessions, parti-
cularly in the Egyptian sector, in return for peace... I have
neither an historical attachment, nor any other attachment to
Sinai. For me Sinai is mainly a card for bargaining in order
to achieve peace, or in order to achieve a significant move
toward peace, and it is worthwhile to yield for the sake of
peace.
In the absence of peace, Sinai provides us with strategic
depth and the ability to defend ourselves against the largest
and strongest of the Arab states."
Portions of the conquered lands, however, were not to be placed
on the bargaining table. Jerusalem, for example, was considered a part
of Israel and definitely not a bargaining item. When defense minister
Moshe Dayan entered Old Jerusalem shortly after its capture he announced,
"We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned
J c . .,126never to be parted from it again.
The acquisition and incorporation of the Old City was accomplished
primarily because of historical and religious identification. The
Golan Heights, however, was incorporated because of its security
implications. Concerning this area Prime Minister Rabin said, ..."As
for the Golan Heights, my view is that even in return for peace, the
State of Israel cannot, from a security point of view come down from
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the Golan Heights." Thus, the disposition of the captured territory
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became a vivid example of security policies arising from geography.
In this example, though, Israel had the unique ability to alter both
the policy and the geography.
As a geo-strategic overview, the 1967 war greatly altered Israel's
position. Although increasing her area, the land borders of Israel
were reduced by more than one- third. The boundary with Jordan was
now only 50 miles while that with Egypt went from 165 to a mere 60
miles. The new frontiers tended to follow natural boundaries. The
barrier between Egypt and Israel became the Suez Canal; the Jordan
River because of Israel's conquests became the defacto demarcation
between Jordan and Israel; and finally, the promontory position
enjoyed by Syria on the Golan Heights was reversed when the war
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redefined the frontier between Syria and Israel.
Although the hostilities won some of Israel's security objectives, S
she did not achieve space. She increased her defensive depth and
military maneuvering area; she destroyed Arab armaments and military
equipment; and she regained access to the southern sea lanes. But,
the Arabs apparently were unwilling to settle their differences with
Israel in exchange for the return of their captured lands. The sur-
prise and humiliation suffered by the Arab armies seemed only to
heighten their hatred and resolve. Hasanaya Haikal, editor of Cairo's
daily, Al-Ahram
,
verbalized the Arab's feelings thusly:
"There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory stretching
from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and numbers 100 million
souls. The unity of this nation is not a subject for debate... At
the heart of this nation a foreign unit has been formed, in the
shape of a sharp-angled triangle. .. this triangle separates the
eastern Arab territory and peoples from the western Arab territory
and peoples... In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an
artificial island... in the midst of the Arab ocean. This situation
cannot persist no matter what extraordinary resources are supplied.
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The waves on both sides will continue to beat against this
artificial island and in the course of time will wear it down
until it breaks and falls apart and is swept away in the mighty
expanse of the ocean."
The attitude exemplified by Haikal's writing characterized the
interim between the 1967 war and the October war of 1973. This period
was not unlike the previous interim periods which were typified by
terrorist activity with Israeli retaliations. Perhaps the geo-
strategic change was that the Israelis rushed to build kibbutzim on
the captured land in order to fully enjoy the protective security of
their new territorial depth.
The October War, in fact, did very little to alter the geo-
strategic situation. The frontier shared with Egypt was forced
eastward and Egypt again controlled both sides of the canal.
However, the coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria was strategically
important to Israel for other reasons. The long standing policy of
facing one enemy at a time was dealt a serious blow by the well
rehearsed, simultaneous attacks by the two Arab antagonists. The
latest war convinced many in Israel that their survival depended
upon holding the captured lands. They reasoned that an Israel with
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pre-1967 borders would not have survived the attack.
Another strategically important development arising out of the
October War was again centered on Israel's access to the sealanes
via the Red Sea. Just as Nasser had used Sharm al-Sheikh in 1967 to
stop Israeli shipping at the Strait of Tiran, Sadat sought to embargo
Israeli trade at the Bab al-Mandeb Strait near the mouth of the Red
Sea. Egypt leased the island of Perim from the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen from which to command the strait. The embargo was
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not in force long enough to be telling and it was overshadowed by the
struggle in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. However, it did drama-
131
tize the continued geographic vulnerability of Israel.
C. CURRENT GEOSECURITY ISSUE AREAS
1. Internal Divisions
Surely the major security problem facing Israeli leadership
since the 1973 War has been and is finding a peaceful solution, an
accord if you will, with the Arab world. How can Israel continue to
exist as a Jewish state with desired security and prosperity while
surrounded by nations bent on its destruction; this is the problem.
The correct path toward obtaining these economic, political and reli-
gious security goals, in essence the security of the state, is of course
a subject of great debate in Israel's policy-making process. Looking
into this process is beyond the scope of this research but the author
will look briefly into two general suggested solutions: (1) the peace
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movement and (2) the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) movement.
The ideological basis of both of these above mentioned movements
deal with the disposition of the lands captured in the 1967 June War.
The peace movement is basically in favor of Israel making concessions
to their Arab neighbors in order to achieve a lasting peace settlement.
These concessions are mainly meant to be the return of captured Arab
lands compensated by security guarantees. There are two major problems
which have prohibited any cohesion in this movement. The first diffi-
culty is determining what borders are acceptable to Israel. How much
land can be given back and still permit Israel to maintain her security
should bartered peace treaties break down? The second problem is that
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any concession requires Arab cooperation. Unilateral action on the
part of Israel is simply out of the question. Thus, without Arab
participation the only specifics this movement can support is that
Israel should return to borders roughly equivalent to those which
existed prior to the June War. Such a concession would be agreed
upon in return for assurances of nonbelligerency from the major
Arab nations. In spite of the problem areas noted it is important
to point out that virtually all major political groups in Israel are
willing to return to June 4, 1967 borders in exchange for security
133
guarantees.
On the other end of the argument is the Land of Israel Move-
ment. The security stance invisioned by this group is simply to
retain all occupied lands. In the long run, they want these lands to
be formally and legally brought into the Israeli state. Their hard
line position is based on a gambit of justifications ranging from
national security goals to divine right. Although the Land of Israel
Movement is not widely embraced there have been extensive Jewish settle-
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ment activity in all of the occupied areas.
Central government policies concerning the captured lands is
more in line with that of the peace movement. Although these policies
are constrained and influenced by the problems cited above and the more
radical politics of the Land of Israel Movement. They reflect the
security strategy of Israel - a strategy based largely on geography.
Looking at the captured territories one at a time, the contemporary
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2. The Sinai Peninsula
Turning first to the Sinai peninsula, Israel had cut the
invasion routes through the coastal passageway and the Mitla and
Gidi Passes far forward at the Suez Canal in the Six Day War of 1967.
The Suez line was breached, however, by Egypt in the October War.
Israel, subsequently, withdrew in January 1974 in the "first step"
Disengagement Agreement (see map p. 69 ). The best fall-back position
was, of course, the occupation of the passes. These, however, were
given up in the "second step" of September 1975. Consequently,
Israel through airpower, sought to keep the Sinai free of Egyptian
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military power - the Sinai became a buffer. So, Israel's security
does not depend upon an occupied Sinai, but a demilitarized Sinai.
This view was reflected during the Camp David talks in the fall of
1978 when Israel expressed a willingness to almost totally withdraw
and return the peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty in return for guaran-
tees of demilitarization northeast of the Gidi and Mitla Passes.
(Israel also wanted assured access to the Gulf of Aqaba, but this pre-
occupation diminished greatly when during the October War they saw
that their shipping was vulnerable as far south as the Bab al-Mandeb.
Being beyond their power projection capabilities, Israel had to
depend on retaliation or third power intervention to gain freedom of
-u 137the seas.
3. The Golan Heights
The situation on the Golan Heights differs from that in the
Sinai. Syria was prevented from shelling Israeli settlements in the




















































to the Sinai, the Golan Heights does not have the area to be an effec-
tive buffer. Even if demilitarized, the Golan Heights would not, in
terms of warning times and maneuvering distance, provide Israel with
any degree of security on her border with Syria. As was mentioned
before, Israel cannot afford to come down from the Golan. Some critics
of Israel's Golan policy say that she has given up the buffer advantage
by allowing settlements in the area (see map p. 71 ) . In other words,
by settling the Golan Heights the Israeli population is again vulnerable.
But subscribing to that theory would be forgetting the military early
warning advantages offered by the Kibbutzim. Thus, the Golan Heights
is not a strategic asset to Israel unless occupied by Israel. From a
security point of view, Israel cannot change her Golan policy unless
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she is sure that Syrian policy toward her has favorably changed.
4. The West Bank and Gaza
Unlike the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip cannot be viewed as frontier or geographical problems.
The threat to Israel from these areas is demographic. Terrorist attacks
on Israel originating from the West Bank and Gaza will undoubtedly
continue whether Israel or Arab governments control the predominantly
Palestinian regions. The same problems would probably exist if Israel
returned some, all, or none of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Arab
administration.
If, through emotional attachment, Israel should choose to annex
these areas the large Arab population would, in the long run, alter the
character of Israel and adversly affect her internal security. The
best Israel could hope for would be to retain the maximum amount of land
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reach an accord with Jordan whereby the Arab towns of Nablus, Rama 11ah,
Hebron and Jericho were turned over to Jordanian administration while
Israel held the remainder of the West Bank, she would have a half
million fewer Arabs and would be in a better position to control her
population dynamics. However, it seems that Israel's long term security
would be best served by restoring Arab authority over the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank. Only a legitimate Arab government at peace with
139
Israel could effectively control the Arab terrorism.
In summary, the importance of geography has been revealed
throughout the entire history of Israel from Biblical to modern times.
Her borders have always been vulnerable on all land-bound sides and
her access to needed raw materials has been seriously threatened. This
geographic insecurity was eased in 1967 when Israel acquired, through
military conquest, new lands and new frontiers. This new geography
did not, however, fully solve Israel's security problems. She did
allow herself, through the territorial conquests, some warning of
coming attacks and space in which to counter them. Concisely, Israel,
by acquiring Arab lands, enhanced her defense. But, the fact that a
military defeat could well cost Israel her existence remained. Her
security policies were and are, consequently, bound to her geographic
vulnerabilities. As is evidenced by the ongoing return of the Sinai
to Egypt, Israel will not give up territory without reasonable security
guarantees including demilitarization of the returned land. As yet,
Israel has been unwilling to retreat from her positions on the Golan
Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And until she feels that
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her security does not depend on these positions she is not likely to
return them to Arab sovereignty.
The hostilities between these two peoples, the Arabs and the
Jews, arose at least partially because Zionism and national awareness
among the Arabs were born and grew at the same time in the same geo-
graphic area. Additionally, the initial immigrations, primarily from
Europe, were accomplished because of western European influence and
support. This association naturally brought on accusations of Euro-
pean colonialism and imperialism from the Arab world. The Arabs having
been Ottoman subjects and later under European domination were probably
becoming a little xenophobic. The Jews, at the same time, were escaping
persecution. Thus, each group was exclusivist. Their respective reli-
gions, after all, taught each that they were chosen people. Both are
anti- imperialist, but, ironically, each appears to the other as expan-
sionistic and aggressive. The point here is that the hostilities between
these two nations cannot be reduced to simple terms. The dynamics of
geographic oriented security policy are, undoubtedly, an aid in
understanding this most complex problem. And, to be sure, frontier
adjustments and related security policy refinements will continue on
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both sides until the Arab world and Israel find peace.
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IV. SYRIA AND IRAQ
A. SYRIA
1. Historical and Geographical Setting
The Syrian Arab Republic occupies only a fraction of the geo-
graphical area known as greater or geographical Syria. Historically,
the name Syria refers to the geographical region lying at the Eastern
end of the Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai and Turkish peninsulas.
This region was a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 until the end of
World War I. Today the states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel
141
occupy this area known as greater Syria.
Greater Syria is delineated by natural boundaries. The northern
barrier of the region is the Taurus- mountains, which are met in the west
by the Mediterranean Sea. The eastern desert runs through Arabia to the
Sinai Peninsula and bounds the region to the south. The four modern
countries which make up the region, however, are for the most part
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separated from each other by artificial demarcations.
The artificial boundaries cited above were products of British
and French geo-politics during and immediately after World War I. In
the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1916, Britain and France agreed
to give paramount influence in Syria to the French while Jordan and
Palestine went to the British. This dividing of the spoils, as it were,
ran counter to another British agreement in which the aid of Sharif
Husein of Mecca, the de facto leader of much of the Arab world, was
entitled against the Ottomans. In return for his support, Husein
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demanded the independence for Iraq, the Arabian peninsula (with the
exception of Aden), and for all geographic Syria. Sir Henry McMahon,
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the British High Commissioner in Egypt, agreed to Husein's conditions.
In October 1918, Prince Faysal, the son of Sharif Husein,
entered Damascus as a popular hero and assumed that part occupied by
French troops, and in July of the following year proclaimed Syria to
be independent. But, this independent greater Syria proved to be
short lived. The geo-strategies of France and Great Britain were not
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compatible with the nationalistic goals of Husein and his followers.
Problems facing the Arab's quest for statehood in Syria included
Britain's desire to maintain a foothold in the area in order to counter
Russian encroachments and to protect oil interests. Additionally,
France was determined to remain a power in the Middle East, and would,
therefore, not give up what she considered to be her colonies. But,
the most unsettling, long term hinderance to the formation and main-
tenance of a Syrian state was Zionism, the emergence of the Jewish state
in Palestine. The consequence of these European imperialistic poli-
cies was that Husein's declaration of independence was ignored, and at
San Remo, Italy in April 1920, France and Great Britain divided greater
Syria into mandates. In the region Britain gained mandate authority
over Palestine and Transjordan while the French were awarded the area
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now occupied by Syria and Lebanon.
The purpose of recounting the political maneuvering leading to
the division of greater Syria into four smaller states is to show the
bonds which link the artificially delineated Syrian Arab Republic to
the more natural entity of greater Syria. The central point here is
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that geographical security policy originating in Damascus, Syria's
capital, is often based on the nationalistic concept of greater Syria.
Thus, Syria's geo-security policy is frequently manifested in the
irredenta. In her recent history Syria has repeatedly demonstrated that
geography, particularly this irredenta, is an integral if not the central
tenet of their security policy. To support this thesis the study will
investigate three Syrian policy issue areas: (1) Alexandretta,
(2) Israel/Palestine and (3) Lebanon.
2. Alexandretta
The first geo-security problem facing the new Syrian state was
the severance of Alexandretta. As the post-war settlements broke
geographic Syria into fragments, the French used a similar dismember-
ment tactic to weaken the Syrian nationalistic sentiment and foster
regionalism. Thus, the northwest province of Alexandretta was given a
separate government responsible to the French high commissioner in
n • - 146Beirut.
Turkey, ostensibly seeking to protect the large Turkish popu-
lation of Alexandretta but in reality seeking the geographical advan-
tages offered by the regions excellent port facilities, requested
the cession of the district known in Turkey as Hatay. Because of
Syrian protest, France put the question to the League of Nations. The
League's commission recommended local autonomy in Alexandretta but
suggested that Syria remain the guardian in international affairs.
The League's findings, however, soon became moot when on 23 June 1939,
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The Syrian nationalists naturally saw the cession of Alexandre tta
as a threat to their geographic security. Additionally, with Palestine
being under the British Mandate and Lebanon being separated from Syria
by the French, the loss of Alexandretta was beginning to threaten
Syria's access to the sea. Being under the French Mandate, Syria had
no legally recognized recourse. The disapproval continues today along
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with the hope that Hatay might someday be retroceded to Syria.
3. The Golan Heights and the Palestinian Question
The most important security issue involving geographic deter-
minants facing Syria today is the recovery of the Golan Heights which
has been occupied by Israel since June 1967. The strategic value of
the Golan Heights has been discussed earlier in this work, but con-
cisely, its value lies primarily in its military significance. - The
access to the plateau from Israel is extremely restricted, while its
elevation (400-1700 ft. above the Huleh Valley) permits a commanding
view of Israel's agriculturally rich Huleh Valley and menaces the
industrial area of Haifa-Akko only 60 miles distant (see map p. 79 ).
Although the occupation of the Golan places Israeli forces closer to
Damascus, the worth to Israel is one of denial. In other words,
Israel is much more secure by denying Syria access to the Golan
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Plateau.
The value of the Golan Heights to Syria is a very complex
issue and encompasses the larger Palestinian question. As illustrated
above, Syrians cannot divorce the Palestinian territorial problems from
their own. Palestine was after all a part of greater Syria, and there
are many refugees from occupied Palestine living in Syria today. Further,
80

though less tangible, Syria claims to be the center of the Arab world
and the consequent leader in the fight against Israel. Syrian senti-
ments on Palestine were probably best summed by President Assad in
the following statement:
It might be useful to remind those in power in Israel
that Palestine is not only part of the Arab homeland but
is a principal part of Southern Syria. . .Palestine will
remain part of the liberated Arab homeland and part of our
country - Arab Syria- or more concisely: Palestine
is Southern Syria.
Syria's geo-security policy did suffer a setback at the hands
of Israel in the June War of 1967; she lost the strategic advantage
afforded by the Golan Heights. But possibly more damaging, her per-
ceived status as leader of the Arab world was diminished by the
humiliating territorial loss. Syria's policy arising from the Golan
situation is simple, straightforward, and, from the point of view of
most Syrians, without alternative - recapture the occupied territory.
The only issues yet to be reconciled then are the means and timing
* ,u 152of the recovery.
Most recently, Syria's overriding policy to regain sovereignty
over the Golans has been dealt a serious blow. The peace accord
between Egypt and Israel has left Syria in the impossible position of
confronting Israel alone. Syria blames the untenable position on the
United States. In the words of a Syrian official: "The U.S. is trying
to divide the Arabs, ignore the Palestinians and engineer a separate
peace between Egypt and Israel, while making Israel so strong militarily
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that she will never give us our land back." Thus, the Syrian secu-
rity policy which is rooted in geographical considerations is also a
determinant of Syrian-U.S. relations.
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Another significant fallout of Syria's Golan policy is growing
Soviet influence in the country. If, as cited above, the U.S. is
perceived to be responsible for the continued occupation of Syrian
territory, the perception offers an opening for increased Soviet
suasion. The Syrians, in fact, depend upon the Soviet Union for
military material, training and support. In the past, Syria has been
unable to prosecute any policy without Soviet backing, and it is
reasonably certain that any actions taking place in the short term
154future will be subject to a degree of Soviet approval.
4. Lebanon
Nowhere is Syria's geo-security policy more evident than in its
actions toward Lebanon. The maintenance of a healthy Lebanese state is
a fundamental tenet of Syrian policy. President Assad said the following
about the well-being of Lebanon, "It is difficult to distinguish between
the security of Lebanon, in the wider sense of the word, and the security
of Syria." Another Syrian offical, Zuheir Muhsin, had this to say
about Lebanon: "The defense of Lebanon is an integral part of the
defense program of Syria and the Palestinian revolution." But,
recently Lebanon's health has been threatened by the disruption of the
delicate internal demographic balance and resultant civil war.
France planted the seeds, so to speak, of these demographic
problems when she, as mandate authority, carved the Lebanese state from
greater Syria. Lebanon, in 1920, was created in order to separate
Syria's predominantly Christian populated areas from the predominantly
Muslim areas. France arranged to include the Muslim populated port of
Tripoli in the new Lebanese state and thus diluted the Christian
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majority. By 1975 the Christians had lost their majority. Political
stability probably could have been maintained if large numbers of
Palestinian refugees had not placed disproportionate weight on the
demographic balance.
The immediate cause of Lebanon's security problems was the
large influx of Palestinians following the 1967 June War and, more
directly, after "Black September" (the expulsion of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization from Jordan) in 1970. The mostly Muslim
Palestinians altered Lebanon's social structure, and their commando
activities directed against Israel brought disruptive retaliatory raids
and shelling from Israel. The now minority Christians, particularly
those in southern Lebanon, began to fear the loss of their political
power base. Some even became allied with the Israelis because of
their common anti-PLO feelings. The net result of the social and poli-
tical pressure caused by the Palestinian refugees was the 1975-76
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civil war.
The hostilities in Lebanon presented serious threats to
Syria's geographic-security system for three reasons. First, the
mountains of southern Lebanon provide Syria with a natural defensive
boundary. If the political disintegration of Lebanon permitted Israel
to annex this southern area, Syria would be seriously menaced. A
second threat arose repeatedly during the civil war when some Christian
parties presented partition as a solution to the hostilities. Syria's
response to this partition suggestion was that another Israel-like
state was not needed in the area. The military disadvantages to Syria
from such a solution would obviously be similar to that of Israeli
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annexation, but the probable domestic political ramifications presented
a third problem area. If the Syrian government permitted such a
minority group secession, even in Lebanon, she would loosen the
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control over her own many minority groups.
Syria's response to Lebanon's political and social disinte-
gration was to dispatch various military units including Syrian-backed
Palestinian units and regular Syrian army units into the troubled
country. Ostensibly, these troops were sent to "keep the peace," but
they, in fact, aided the Christian Phalangists against the Palestinians
A T U 1 *«~l _ 160and Lebanese leftists.
The Syria strategy, in supporting the Phalangists, was to
ensure the geographical integrity of Lebanon. Syria obviously felt
that if the Christians were defeated or greatly weakened by the com-
bined Palestinian and leftist forces Israel would be galvanized into
military intervention. The danger, from Syria's point of view, was
that a joint Christian and Israeli action would eventually separate
southern Lebanon from central government control and, by so doing,
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give Israel the highly valued geographic buffer.
In 1978, the civil strife in Lebanon again broke into hostile
conflict. But, by this time, Israel and the Christian militiamen of
Lebanon had formed a symbiotic relationship. The Christians depended
upon Israel for their arms supply and, in return, the Christians kept
the Palestinians militarily off balance. The result of this relation-
ship was that Israel had gained a certain degree of geographic security.
This Israeli gain, of course, translated from the Syrian view point into
geographic insecurity. Thus, Syrian troops entered the renewed
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Lebanese conflict supporting regular Lebanese troops and Palestinians
against the Christians. The goal, as in the 1975-76 civil war, was to
ensure the geographic integrity of their buffer. Thus, the Syrians
were not seeking to advance an ideology or bolster a religion or
government. Rather, they were prosecuting their own national security
1 fi?
policy based on the geographic buffer of Lebanon.
At the date of this writing, Syria still has more than 20,000
"peace keeping" troops in Lebanon while Syrian jets periodically
clash over Lebanon with Israeli air forces. Syria is, thereby,
fulfilling two basic strategic needs. First, by keeping herself
militarily active against Israel, she fulfills her self-appointed role
as leader of the Arab's war against Israel and exhibits no acquiescence
in her policy to regain the Golan Heights. Secondly, Syria continues
to maintain, albeit weakly, the territorial integrity of Lebanon.
Thus, it has been demonstrated that Syria's security policy
has been and is principally based on geographical consideration,
particularly the recovery of irredenta. Additionally, she strives to
hold together the Arab countries of greater Syria to form a buffer
system and an unofficial alliance against Israel.
B. IRAQ
1. Historical and Geographical Setting
Long in the backwater of Turkish and world geo-politics, the
modern state of Iraq emerged from the defeated Ottoman Empire following
World War I. The country, made of three Ottoman provinces, Basrah,









artificial creation of European politics. Significantly, she was not
a naturally evolved nation; she was rent with ethnic and religious
schisms and her borders were established largely to satisfy the needs
of external powers.
To understand the origins of Iraq's geographic and demographic
situation and the resulting geo-security policy it is necessary to
investigate, if only briefly, the geo-strategy of the competing world
powers during the years leading up to the first world war and the sub-
sequent Iraqi independence.
In 1899 Germany obtained from the Ottoman Empire a concession
to build a railroad from southwest Turkey to Baghdad; another concession
was granted in 1902 to continue the railroad from Baghdad to Basrah on
the Persian Gulf. The German goal in these concessions was, of course,
1 ft S
to gain commercial and political influence in the Middle East Region.
Great Britain looked upon Mesopotamia, Persia and Afghanistan
as vital geographic links between the Mediterranean and her most prized
colony, India. England felt that her influence had to be paramount in
these areas in order to ensure the security of India. Additionally,
Britain was concerned about the safety of her Persian oil interests.
Thus, the rise of German influence, represented by the Berlin-Baghdad-
Basrah railway, threatened Britain's paramountcy and, consequently, the
_ „ , _ , . ,
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well-being of her mercantile system.
A third world power whose geo-strategy ran counter to the aspira-
tion of both Germany and Great Britain was Russia. The Czars' long
standing quest to expand southward to warm water was inconsistent with
the commercial and security goals of the other two imperialistic powers.
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Russia was, however, exhausted from her war with the Japanese (1904-
05) and was temporarily unable to compete with her rivals. Through
diplomacy she was able to cut her losses by gaining a sphere of
influence in northern Persia. The British permitted this Russian
sphere of influence officially in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of
1907, and by so doing, Britain greatly enhanced her own Middle Eastern
position. As a quid pro quo the war-weakened Russians had no choice
but to acknowledge British influence and special interests in the
"I c. -j
Persian Gulf area.
The net effect of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in the Iraqi
area was that only Germany and Britain were left competing for influence.
The British, exercising considerable political power with local leaders,
were able to neutralize the German influence and, consequently, stall
the Berlin-Baghdad-Basrah railroad construction. Thus, the battle
lines for the first world war were beginning to emerge in Middle
i • • 168Eastern geo-politics
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World War I facilitated the Arab independence or nationalistic
movement. Represented by Husein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, the Arabs
agreed to support the Arab independence movement following the war.
However, the allies, specifically the British and French, were less
inclined to make good their promises after victory was achieved. Iraq
and the other Arab countries were, in fact, liberated from the defeated
Ottoman Empire, but Great Britain was unwilling to allow self-determination.
Iraq was still an asset in the geographic security system of the British
Empire, and influence in that Middle Eastern nation would not readily
169
be surrendered by Great Britain.
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When the allied powers met in San Remo, Italy (28 April 1920)
following the war, France and Great Britain were awarded Mandates over
Arab territories of the fallen Ottoman Empire. Iraq and Palestine
were placed under the British Mandate and Syria was mandated to France.
However, there was some problem in establishing the borders between
the two Mandates. Mosul and a large portion of the northern territory
of present day Iraq were originally designated for French influence.
The British saw this would-be French controlled territory as a buffer
between themselves and the Bolshevik Russians. But, it soon became
clear that Russia would be unable to achieve territorial dominance
in the Middle East as she had hoped. In short, the British found
that she would not have to share any frontiers with the powerless
Russians and would, therefore, not need the French buffer.
Britain, seeing the Russians as helpless in her Middle Eastern
sphere of activity, reasserted her influence in Mosul (British troops,
to strengthen her bargaining position, occupied Mosul after the armi-
stice was signed with Turkey on 30 October 1918.) The French, of course,
resisted these British power politics, but acquiesced in return for
promised security backing in Europe, British concessions in Syria and
a share in Mosul oil wealth. Thus, the Ottoman territory was transferred
to Great Britain instead of France and the northern border of Iraq was
delineated.
The nomadic desert tribes also presented border problems. It
was impossible to determine a boundary with Saudi Arabia which would
not hinder the seasonal movements of these tribes. Treaty arrangements
were, therefore, made with the Saudis which allows the Muntafiq, Dhafir
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and Amarat tribesmen to enter Iraq. The same tribal problem existed
on the Syrian frontier. The difficulties here were compounded by ques-
tions of Tigris and Euphrates water rights. All negotiations, in this
instance, were handled by the British and French High Commissioner for
their respective Mandates. Not until 1932 did these negotiators reach
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a satisfactory resolution.
Perhaps the most difficult settlement for the British to achieve
was over the Iraqi border with Turkey. Under Kemal Ataturk, Turkey,
like Iraq, was also involved in nation-building and was reluctant to
give up strategic territory to a conceivably hostile neighbor. Thus,
Turkey greatly preferred southern borders which extended far enough
south to allow easy access into the Mesopotamia plain. And, naturally,
Iraq and the British wanted to deny such a strategic advantage to the
Turks. The issue finally had to be resolved by the League of Nations
which ruled in favor of the British. The ruling gave Iraq a significant
geographic advantage but it also placed a large Kurdish minority in
Iraq. The remaining border with Persia presented no legal problems
so long as Britain exercised extensive influence on both sides of the
k a 173boundary.
The Mandate of Iraq awarded to the British under the San Remo
Agreement provoked extensive protest in Iraq. Arab nationalism which
began under Ottoman domination continued and perhaps intensified under
the non-Muslim British. This dissatisfaction with foreign rule, by
July 1920, had reached explosive levels. An anti-British revolt broke





In an effort to defuse the revolt a provisional Arab government
was then created. This government came into being in October of 1920
and operated under the direction of the British High Commission for
Iraq. Prince Faisal, the son of Husein ibu Ali and descendant of the
Prophet was installed as monarch in order to lend legitimacy. Faisal
was approved in a referendum of the Iraqi elite by near unanimity and
on August 23, 1921, was proclaimed king.
The British government, however, was still not able to win
approval for their own presence; in fact, the disapproval was growing
even in Great Britain. Thus, as dictated by circumstances, the British,
after many attempts to soften the Mandate relationship, supported Iraq's
entry into the League of Nations and thereby granted full sovereignty
and independence to Iraq. Britain was able to maintain the Iraqi
link to her security system, despite Iraq's independence, through the
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which took effect on October 3, 1932, the day of
independence. This alliance was designed to last for 25 years, guaran-
teeing mutual assistance in time of war and "full and frank consultation
...in all matters of foreign policy." The treaty, incidentally, was
utilized by the British in 1941 to justify their reoccupation of Iraq
during World War II. Again, Great Britain was protecting strategic
interests in the Persian Gulf oil fields and the routes to India. At
a time when it appeared very likely that the Arabs would cast their
lot with the Germans the British took the only prudent strategic move
and denied the geographically important Iraq to the Germans.
Thus, it has been exhibited that Iraq was created largely as
an instrument of European geo-security policies. Her international
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boundaries exist as a result of Great Britain's power and influence.
But, in many respects, the best interests of Iraq and Britain were
parallel. The Iraqi state that was carved out of the dying Ottoman
Empire was and is geographically very fortunate. She has, perhaps, the
greatest agriculture potential of any country in the Middle Eastern
region and her oil reserves are among the world's richest. . . Additionally
she has easy access to the world's markets through the Persian Gulf.
However, the artificial delineation of Iraq's international borders
wrought significant internal and frontier security problems.
Demographically speaking, Iraq is in an unstable position. She
is a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional differences -
differences which, at times, have threatened the security of the nation.
The population of approximately twelve and a half million is comprised
of roughly 71% Arabs, over 18% Kurds, 2 1/2% Turkomans, .7% Assyrians
178
and others. ' The political control of the country is, of course,
held by the Arabs. But, the authority of the central government has
been repeatedly challenged by the above listed minority groups. Signi-
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ficant among the challenges are those mounted by the Kurds.
2. Demographic Security Problems (the Kurds)
The insecurity caused by the autonomy seeking minority groups
is one of two major national security problem areas which are rooted
in Iraq's geography. The second is guaranteeing her opening to the
Persian Gulf and the high seas. The policy and concern arising from
Iraq's small, vulnerable opening to the Gulf at the mouth of Shatt al
Arab has been the catalyst in long term disputes with the Iranians and
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Kuwaitis. The Kurdish, Shatt al Arab and Kuwaiti issues are all a
result of Iraq's geographic situation. Additionally, these issues
have dominated in recent years the security policy of Iraq. Thus,
to further illustrate their significance and support of the thesis,
the Kurdish problem and the Shatt al Arab and Kuwaiti issues will
be examined in more detail.
As cited above, the main minority ethnic groups is that of the
Kurds. Most of the Iraqi Kurds live in the north and north-east areas
of the country. Small Kurdish groups also live in Syria and Soviet
Russia, but the Iraqi Kurds are a part of approximately six million
who extend into Turkey and Iran. Although Iraq has far fewer Kurds
than either Turkey or Iran, the percentage of the total population is
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much greater in Iraq and, therefore, more politically significant.
When the multinational Ottoman Empire was being dismembered
following World War I the Wilsonian principle of self-determination
stirred the national aspirations of the Kurds. Primarily as a result
of their friendly relations with the British the Kurds were promised,
under the Treaty of Sevre's, an autonomous and possibly independent
Kurdistan. The designated territory for Kurdistan fell mainly in
what is today eastern Turkey. But, the artificial line separating
these Kurds in eastern Turkey or Kurdistan from the kinsmen in Iran,
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Iraq and Syria did not curb the nationalism on either side of the line.
The Kurdish national aspirations were manifested in a revolt or
series of revolts. In Turkey the rebellion lingered for 12 years until
crushed by the Turkish military in 1947. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds
were demanding autonomy from the British who were exercising Mandate
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authority over the country. But, Great Britain was not about to give
away any strategic or economic oil influence in the area. The Kurd's
recourse was rebellion which was intermittent and widespread in 1919,
1927 and during the 1930-32 period. There was very little or no success
to which the Kurds could rally. They had no outside sponsor to aid
them against their relatively powerful British and Iraqi opponents.
However, this situation changed when the Russians, with all their
newly-acquired strength, occupied Azerbaijan during World War II.
Moscow offered its protection and encouragement to various independence
seeking groups in Iran. In January 1946 the Iranian Kurds under
Russian guidance declared their independence as the Republic of Mahabad.
Being contiguous to Mahabad the Kurdish movement in Iraq was naturally
i «. A 183accelerated.
Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, who led the Kurdish rebellion in
Iraq from 1943-45, moved several thousand of his tribal revolutionaries
into Mahabad to support the national effort. They were soon forced to
flee into Russia. The absence of Barzani and his troops essentially
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killed the rebellion in Iraq from 1945 until 1959.
Turkey, Iran and Iraq acted in concert to suppress the Kurds,
and were consequently able to keep to a minimum any separatist acti-
vity. This cooperation fell along the Iraqi monarchy, in 1958. Under
the new Qassem government al-Barzani and his remaining 855 followers
were allowed to return to Iraq on October 6, 1959. Qassem' s warming
to al-Barzani and the Kurds was indicative of growing Iraqi-Soviet
friendship. As this friendship cooled so did the political fortunes
of the Kurds. But, the Soviet relationship was not the absolute barometer;
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in fact, the nationalistic tendencies of the Kurds were simply too
IOC
divergent from the goals of the Arab controlled central government.
The rebellion was rekindled when, in July of 1961, Kurdish
demands of autonomy were rejected by the Qassem regime. The rebellion,
backed extensively by Iran, lasted until May 1975. The Kurds lost the
wherewithal to carry on their revolt when Iran and Iraq reached a
detente. As a consequence of the Iran-Iraqi rapproachement, Iran
stopped all military and financial aid to the Kurds. Thus, in a very
short while, the rebellion ended and the Kurds were again suppressed
1
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by the cooperative efforts of Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
Thus, the Kurds, by accident of arbitrary boundaries, became
a nation without legally-recognized territory. Their quest for state-
hood and autonomy is in direct opposition to the security goals of
the central Iraqi government. The basic problem between the Arab
and Kurd ethnic groups of Iraq is one of complete distrust. The
Iraqis are convinced that the real goal of the Kurds is to create
their own independent state in the oil-rich north-eastern region of
the country. The Kurds, on the other hand, deny that they want to
secede. They contend though that the central government wishes to
deprive them of their rights, specifically their rightful share of the
oil wealth. The officially-backed immigration of Arabs into the
187
Kirkuk region seems to substantiate their fears.
The Arabs, to support their suspicions, need only to point
to a provocative interview given by al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader, to
an American correspondent. In the interview Barzani said that for
humanitarian or military help the Kurds would take the Kirkuk oil
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fields and turn them over to the Americans to operate. Because the
Kurds are ethnically different and they are so regionalized they present
a demographic and geographic security problem to Iraq. Kurdish mili-
tancy can only be effective with outside help; they have therefore
been used as an instrument of Iranian and Soviet policy to exert
influence or power on Iraq. Concisely, the Kurdish quest for auto-
nomy has been a source of conflict, political instability and a serious
drain on the country's resources. The Kurdish issue is a major national
security problem in Iraq. The Kurds and their goals are a constant
in the politics of this volatile region. It seems to be only a ques-
tion of time before this minority ethnic group again threatens Iraqi
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securxty.
3. The Shatt al Arab Dispute
The Shatt al Arab issue is a boundary dispute between Iraq
and Iran. The origins of this dispute go back to the Ottoman Empire
which controlled both sides of the Tigris and Euphrates estuary known
as the Shatt al Arab. When Iraq became independent in 1932 she also
claimed, as a legacy of the fallen empire, both sides of the river.
Iran, however, has long claimed that the proper border demarcation should
run through the center of the estuary. As the oil shipping increased
from the ports of Basrah, Abadan and Khorramshahr the issue became
more heated. With the international boundary on the Iranian side of
the river all trade, even that exclusively in Iranian ports, came
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under the control of Iraq. Iran, whose economic well-being depended
so greatly on oil revenues, looked upon her position on the Shatt al
Arab as unacceptable. Consequently, she unilaterally declared her
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border with Iraq to be the middle of the river. After many incidents
and accusations, a compromise was reached on the boundary issue in
1937. A treaty between the contending kingdoms was signed confirming
Iraq's sovereignty over the 100-mile stretch of the estuary which
divides the two countries. Iraq also retained exclusive navigational
rights up to the low water mark on the Iranian side. Iran, however,
did win a boundary line adjustment in front of her key ports of Abadan,
Khorramshahr, and Khosrowabad where the line was moved to the "thalweg"
190(line of greatest depth or fastest current in the river)
.
The 1937 Shatt al Arab treaty also had provisions confirming
navigation rights to ships of all nations. Iran and Iraq also agreed
to establish a convention regarding pilotage and installation and main-
tenance of navigational aids. The convention was to be worked out by
a commission with equal Iranian and Iraqi representation. Agreement,
however, broke down when Iran insisted that the commission should have
the executive powers to establish the convention. Iraq, having sove-
reignty over most of the waters of the Shatt al Arab, thought that the
commission should have only consultative rights. Because of this
seemingly insignificant disagreement, no convention was ever reached
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and the validity of the treaty remained in doubt.
The Hashimite dynasty in Iraq and the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran
maintained friendly relations until 1958, when the Hashimites fell in
a coup. During this time there was very little dispute over the
Shatt al Arab boundary. But, as trade and associated seaborne traffic
increased and oil revenues became more and more crucial to Iraq's
economic well-being, the value of her sovereign rights over the Shatt
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al Arab, the only access of the otherwise land-locked nation to the
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open sea, became strategic in dimension.
After the Qassem coup in 1958 Baghdad's relations with Iran
began to fray; in December of 1959, the Iraqi government questioned
the validity of the 1937 boundary treaty and demanded that the terri-
tory concessions granted to Iran in that treaty (that part of the Shatt
al Arab roadstead opposite Iran's three major ports) be returned to
Iraqi sovereignty. These political actions by Iraq initiated a series
of minor border skirmishes leading to an Iranian invalidation of the
1937 agreement and a counterclaim of Iranian sovereignty to the thalweg.
Mounting tensions on the border eventually led to complete stoppage
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of Iranian shipping on the Shatt al-Arab in early 1961.
From 1961 until 1969 relations between Iran and Iraq remained,
for the most part, strained. Two notable exceptions occurred during
the regimes of Abdul Salom Aref (November 1963-April 1966) and after
the July 1968 coup of President Bakr when the contested boundary was at
least negotiated. But by April of 1969, Iran's military superiority
was sufficient enough to assert her claims on the Shatt al-Arab. She
dispatched a cargo ship with naval and air protection through the estuary
to the Persian Gulf. For the next six years there was no movement
toward a permanent settlement. Iran, in fact, kept the Iraqis militarily
off balance by supporting the Barzani-led Kurdish rebellion. Iraq's
internal security and her Persian Gulf access were threatened as a
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direct result of this long standing boundary dispute.
Quite unexpectedly, Iran and Iraq reconciled their differences
when in March of 1975, the Shah or Iran and Iraq's Vice President
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Takriti reached an agreement. The reconciliation cost the Kurds their
195Iranian support and Iraq, consequently, enhanced her security position.
4. The Kuwaiti Dispute
The Shatt al-Arab issue demonstrated Iraq's geographic vulnera-
bility - her access to the open seas could hardly be more fragile. This
insecurity brought about by her limited access to the sealanes perhaps
explains, at least in part, the Kuwaiti issue. In June of 1961, the
sheikdom of Kuwait and Britain signed an instrument terminating the
1899 Anglo-Kuwait agreement that had given the British hegemony over
that small state. Six days later, on June 25, 1961, Prime Minister
Qassem of Iraq claimed sovereignty over oil-rich Kuwait. The claim was
justified on the grounds that Kuwait was once a part of the province of
Basra in the now defunct Ottoman Empire. Qassem further stated that
the British recognized the Kuwaiti attachment to Basra in the 1899
treaty. Kuwait, Great Britain and the League of Arab States all
rejected Iraq's claim, and a number of Arab states, in fact, sent
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military contingents to Kuwait to replace British forces.
The central point in recounting the Iraq-Kuwait issue is to
show policy and motives in defending their respective interests which
are so largely dependent on geography. Qassem' s motives in trying to
gain control over Kuwait were, of course, in part economic - the oil
reserves of Kuwait were and are substantial. But, very important
strategically to Iraq was that sovereignty over Kuwait would broaden
her opening to the Persian Gulf - again the policy grew out of geography.
Again, in pursuit of the same geographic goals, Iraq on December
11, 1972, sent a road-building crew with military protection into Kuwaiti
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territory and began building a road to the Persian Gulf. This time the
aggressive act was justified, according to Iraq, because of the mili-
tary threat from Iran. Again, political pressures from other Arab
leaders forced Iraq to withdraw. But Iraq, persistent and undisturbed
by the growing resentment among her fellow Arabs, moved forces into
Kuwait only three months after the road-building incident. This time,
a violent confrontation resulted in two dead and four injured Kuwaiti
border policemen. But, Iraq apparently won Kuwaiti acquiescence to use
her neighbor's territory for strategic purposes. Iraqi goals evidently
were to acquire a strip of Kuwait's coastal territory and the islands
of Warba and Bubiyan. Such an acquisition would have provided protec-
tion for Iraq's new deep-sea port of Urn Qasi. Kuwait was supposedly
willing to lease this territory to Iraq as long as Iraq recognized
197
Kuwaiti sovereignty over the leased parcels.
Today, there is still no permanent solution between Iraq and
Kuwait. But, with the Islamic revolution weakening the military strength
of Iran, Iraq's threat perception has undoubtedly lessened. President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq has, in fact, been supporting the Arab rebellion
in the Iranian state of Khuzestan and is believed to be supporting
Iranian Kurds. Also, Iraq has warned that she intended to withdraw from
the 1975 peace agreement with Iran. In short, Iraq's sea-borne trade
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is today possibly more secure than at any time since her independence.
To recount, Iraq in 1932 joined the family of nations with two
major security debits - the would-be Kurdish state within Iraq and her
small vulnerable access to the Persian Gulf through the Shatt al-Arab.
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Ever since that date, the national security policies and actions of
Iraq have been directed principally at overcoming these two geo-




This study was undertaken to examine the thesis that nation-
states or countries, particularly Middle Eastern countries, have secu-
rity policy tenets which are dictated by geographical considerations.
Before progressing into the research it seemed intuitively pleasing
to allow that security policy had to be affected, if only tangentially,
by geographic characteristics. Policy designers must, after all, seek
to protect the geographical entity which constitutes the state. At
closer inspection, however, not only was the thesis substantiated but
geography was found to be at the very heart of much of the Middle East's
security problems and policies.
The research revealed that Saudi Arabia has two geographic features
which makes her vulnerable to aggression: Her oil fields and her
communication routes to the high seas. The Saudi geo-security policy
is designed, above all else, to safeguard these areas, and all other
security policy of Saudi Arabia seems to be rooted to this basic tenet.
Egypt's security policy makers, it was discovered, must be ever
mindful of her critical areas, the Nile River and its delta and the
Suez Canal. The Nile Valley and delta allows Egypt to exist as a
nation in the middle of an otherwise uninhabitable desert. And the
Suez Canal is a geographic asset which contributes greatly to the.
economic well-being of the country. The security policies of Egypt
are to a great degree bound to this geographic situation. Additionally,
the geo-security policies of various external powers were shown to extend
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to Egypt and the Suez Canal. Egypt is strategically important to
world politics simply because of her position.
Israel, it was found, is an ideal example of geography determining
security policy. Her very existence or survival as a nation depends
upon the maintenance of secure borders and free trade/ communications
routes. She has fought a series of wars with her Arab neighbors with
the objective of protecting her very limited geographic assets.
In the case of Syria and Iraq, certain strategically important
geographic positions were shown to dictate much of their international
and domestic politics. These two countries, in particular, have
policies which are determined by demography. Syria and Iraq are a
group of old nations occupying new states. Maintaining a legitimate
central government in the midst of competing nations has been central
in the security policies of these countries.
In short, this study revealed ample evidence that geographic
considerations permeate security policies in the Middle Eastern region.
The importance of these considerations have not been diminished by
modern technology or communication. They have perhaps become, in
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